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BY:

ANUJ RALHAN

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Introduction

In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu states “*All warfare is based on deception.*”¹ In order to deceive the enemy it is important to obtain information and/or provide misinformation. These deceiving tactics of information warfare have been prevalent in human society for thousands of years, as seen by Cyrus the Great using it against Babylon, Xerxes against the Greeks, and even the conqueror Genghis Khan, who circulated rumors of large numbers of Mongol warriors in his army.² Today, it is arguable that the concepts of information warfare are relatively the same, but the means and technology are different. While information warfare embodies various components, one type in particular is being used more noticeably – psychological operations (psyops). For simplicity, the term’s perception management, psychological warfare, marketing warfare, psyops, psywar, propaganda or any combination of them are assumed synonymous and generally refer to information operations that aim to affect the perceptions and behavior of others in order to influence their psyche through emotions, reasoning, decisions, and ultimately actions.³ Another definition, states that psywar is the use of propaganda against the enemy supported by military, economic or political bodies, intended to demoralize the enemy.⁴ The definition of psyops has evolved into three classes, which are commonly referred to as white, gray and black propaganda. Generally, white propaganda openly reveals the source of its information and is true, while gray propaganda does not reveal its information source and black propaganda gives a misleading source.⁵ This type of warfare, whether it be strategic or tactical, can be used during wartime but is more knowingly being used during non-wartime as seen by people all over the world who are psychologically manipulated, whether it is purposeful or not, via television, radio, and the Internet.

The media can be a very powerful tool for psychological manipulation and can be used very subtly. For example, a psychological marketing victory for De Beers is the perception it has created in the Western world of the value of diamonds. Humans have created the perception of their rarity (e.g. A Diamond is Forever slogan) and their pricey markup value is primarily controlled by the single De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. cartel, based in South Africa. Each year, De Beers fixes the amount of diamonds it sells in the market thereby having control of the market price. According to the Washington Post, De Beers produces half of the world's diamond's supply and controls about two-thirds of the entire world market.⁶ Another example

occurred on December 16, 1997 in Japan when a television program of Pokeman featured Pikachu exploding a bomb followed by flashing red lights in his eyes. This resulted in over 600 children suffering epileptic convulsions. While this was unintentional, it shows the potential for using the media as a mechanism for warfare.⁷

Interestingly, in day-to-day life all over the world, most of the contents that people are being bombarded with in the media are in some way linked, for better or for worse, to the Western world. At this point arises an important question that should be resolved up front. Why is so much information flow (i.e. psychological manipulation) between countries so heavily influenced by the United States? This question can be well answered through an understanding of Thomas Friedman's view on globalization in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. To paraphrase, Friedman basically argues that the world today is built around three balances – the superpower, supermarkets, and super-empowered individual. The first is the traditional balance between nation-states, as the world witnessed during the Cold War era, but today the US leads the spectrum of countries by integrating a dominant culture of technology, while all others are subordinate in some form. The second balance involves the nation-states and global markets, or “supermarkets” such as Wall Street, Hong Kong, Frankfurt, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It refers to the ability for global markets and corporations to invest or withdraw from countries at a click of a button. The final balance is between nation-states and the individual. This refers to how interconnected the world has become resulting in an unlimited movement and extensive reach of individuals, especially via the web. Essentially, today people are “super-empowered individuals”, some are angry and some are not, but nonetheless they can act directly on the world stage without any walls to stop them.⁸

With the arguments presented above, it can be seen how globalization more or less equals Western psychological manipulation and that Western marketing is spreading all over the non-western world in various forms. Nations and people more or less have to decide if they want economic prosperity, political stability, and social freedom as exemplified by the country that has arguably done it the best – the United States. This is not wrong or bad, it is just psychologically affecting millions of people, primarily because of their religious and social perceptions, and as a result has arguably created World War III as we know it today - terrorism. The interesting observation is that Western psychological marketing comes in the form of radio or television to the laymen and in the form of economic development through organizations like

the IMF and World Bank. It is in all levels of society in non-western worlds and no one can escape it. This psychological shift, combined with traditional cultural, religious and social perceptions of non-western countries has resulted in a type of psychological constipation, or what Friedman calls a “poverty of dignity” not a “poverty of wealth.”

It would be an astronomical but worthwhile effort to investigate the intricacies of psychological propaganda used in non-western countries by their local government and external governments. Therefore for simplicity, Indonesia will be the primary focus and the use of psyops by and on Indonesia during wartime and non-wartime will be probed. Specifically, five areas of psyops, which include lies and distortions, denouncement, harassment, advertising, and censorship, will be investigated in Indonesia’s post-independent history.⁹

Indonesia: A Brief Background

To understand how psyops has been used in Indonesia’s recent history, it is first critical to better understand the psyche of the Indonesian government and the people. This understanding is obtainable by outlining a brief lesson in Indonesia’s history. Like many other occupied territories, Indonesia was under Dutch rule for over three hundred years before independence on August 17, 1945. Prior to the Dutch East Indies Company occupation which started roughly in the beginning of the 17th century, the Portuguese held most of the eastern Spice Islands. Islamic traders during and prior to Portuguese rule had brought much of the Malay culture, religion, and language to the Spice Islands of Indonesia.¹⁰ Thus, having an Islamic foundation, a lot of tension was created with Euro occupations. As a result, Islamic sultan’s waged several wars with the Dutch through the 1800s. It wasn’t until the early 20th century did Indonesia see the first wave of strong Islamic nationalists such as *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union) and *Muhammadiyah* (Followers of Muhammad). Out of these nationalist movements arose the leaders of Indonesia such as Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, which resulted in unifying Indonesian people, the creation of a national anthem and national language.¹¹

The Japanese finally defeated the Dutch in Indonesia in March 1942. While the Indonesians initially viewed the Japanese as saviors, this view changed as the Japanese ruled in a more totalitarian way to support the Japanese war effort. However, after the Allied Forces

defeated the Japanese, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed independence, and after a failed attempt by the Dutch to regain control a second time, the Hague Agreement of November 2, 1949 yielded Dutch rule of all Indonesian territories except the western half of New Guinea. Today, Indonesia is a dominant player in the world's economy as its over 13,000 islands that stretches more than 5000 kilometers is home to an abundant amount of natural resources.¹²

After independence in 1945, three constitutions later in 1950, and the first country's general elections in 1955 resulting in extremely disjointed views, it was clear that Indonesia was being torn apart internally from different ideological and religious opinions. Additionally, the president at the time, Sukarno, put economic development behind political and religious order, and this misguided democracy resulted in bleak foreign relations. In fact, in January 1965, Sukarno pulled Indonesia out of the United Nations displeased by their acceptance of Malaysia as a member state.¹³ These pent up tensions had built up for years until it resulted in a covert and mysterious coup on September 30, 1965 resulting in the slaying of seven army generals discussed in further detail below. The army's response to this coup was lead by General Major Mohammed Suharto (also spelt Soeharto) and the following morning the army regained control, claiming that the Indonesian Communist Party, or *Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)* was responsible for the coup.¹⁴ The details of all the events during such a short time period are still vague but the first signs of military psyops in Indonesia begin to crystallize during this time. After gaining control in 1965, Suharto remained leader and president of Indonesia until 1998 when he was finally overthrown. During 33 years of Suharto's patrimonial rule, the Indonesian government, embedded in a complex web of corruption, collusion and nepotism, utilized an abundant amount of psyops to keep Suharto loyalists at the top of the power pyramid.

Psyops Performed by Indonesia

During Non-Wartime

Upon independence in 1947, Sukarno took Indonesia in his stride for almost 20 years, during which time some cloudy psyops and propaganda by Indonesia has been documented. One clear propaganda campaign was Sukarno's view that democracy, in the Western sense of the word, would not be possible in Indonesia. Instead, Sukarno adopted a 'guided democracy'

approach in the role of various functional groups in the government.¹⁵ This approach put a lot of skepticism in the view of the Western world, and the U.S. became very critical of Sukarno in the 50s. The critical view of Indonesia continued as another major propaganda initiative swept through Indonesia in the 50s which was known as the “anti-Malaysia” campaign. While this public stunt gave chills to the U.S., they were confused about how to react to this form of psychological warfare. The U.S. could not determine if the campaign was a result of a genuine fear of American imperialism, a desire to distract Indonesians from domestic troubles, or simply strange outlandish behavior from Sukarno.¹⁶ While this psychological propaganda lasted for a short time, it was an initial taste into the psyops Indonesia was capable of carrying out.

Another documented occurrence of psyops in Indonesia was the mysterious coup that occurred on September 30, 1965. Briefly, during that night, a leftist officer, Lieutenant Colonel Untung and a few members under him, supposedly kidnapped and killed seven high-ranking officers and claimed that the pre-emptive strike was to prevent an imminent coup by a so-called ‘Council of Generals’.¹⁷ Whether this Council existed is unknown and it has been proposed that this fictitious Council may have been a psychological manipulation tool for Suharto to use while masquerading support for Sukarno.¹⁸ Subsequently, Suharto became in control of the army as a result of the killings and in a broadcast speech the following morning, his duplicitous response to the incident was that the coup was a counter-revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party (PKI), and that the army was back in charge. The question of Suharto’s manipulative involvement has increasing credibility by the fact that Suharto knew the members under Untung’s unit who helped kill the generals. One credible piece of evidence that supports this psychological manipulation by Suharto is that the perpetrators of the coup decided to guard all sides of the downtown *Merdeka Square* in Jakarta, except the side where Suharto’s army headquarters were situated.¹⁹ Ultimately after the coup, Sukarno’s coalition broke up and various constituents within his government began fighting against each other. This led to a massive bloodbath that took on forms of an Islamic Jihad, or ‘holy war’, which continued through 1966 resulting in estimates of 300,000-400,000 deaths.²⁰ The military’s role and the psyops they engaged in is not entirely clear and it has been suggested that the Indonesian army engaged in “civic action” programs assisted by the U.S. through supplying weapons, training, and psychological encouragement to civilian gangs who carried out most of the killings.²¹

Nonetheless, after this terrible tragedy which swept across Indonesia, Sukarno's days were numbered and he was soon succeeded by Suharto and his New Order (1965-1998).

Interestingly, another plausible psychological manipulation event that has been documented during the Suharto takeover was *Supersemar* (*surat perintah sebelas maret*) or the 'Letter of 11 March', which ceded full presidential authority to Suharto. It is unclear whether Sukarno wanted the letter drafted or if Suharto and other generals drew it up prior to manipulating Sukarno to sign it. This perceived psychological manipulative incident crept up again to haunt Suharto in the 90s as Indonesians publicized their view of crony businessmen linked to Suharto in their own version of Supersemar - *sudah persis seperti Marcos*, or 'it's exactly the same here as it is under Marcos'.^{22 23}

During Suharto's regime there were several military and police operational units that responded on and off in overt and covert operations, and still do. An understanding of these units is vital before describing what type of psyops occurred. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia is called *Assosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia (Abri)*. Another military unit, which reports to *Abri*, is the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency or *Badan Intelijens Stratejis (Bais)*. *Bais* works closely with paramilitary forces and are responsible for repressing internal threats and gathering nationwide network intelligence.²⁴ The Special Forces Command is known as *Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus)* while the majority of the army reserve consisting of 40,000 troops is known as *Komando Cadangan Stratejis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad)* which means Army Strategic Reserve. The *Kopassus* unit expanded over the years to include a covert operations unit (Group IV) and a secretive anti-terrorist and psychological warfare unit (Group V) modeled after the US army's Delta Force. Finally, the *Rose Team* consisted of 11 members from the covert units that were called upon for the abduction of activists in early 1998.²⁵ The president has his own security force known as the Presidential Security Force or *Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden (Paspampres)* while the Operational Command for the Restoration of Law and Order are known as *Comando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib)*. Police units that are armed are known as *Brimob* short for *Brigade Mobil Polisi* or Mobile Police Brigade.²⁶ With all these military units at his disposal, Suharto would no doubt use them for psychological manipulation and propaganda.


Having taken charge in 1965, Suharto's *Golkar* party (short for *golongan karya*, or functional groups such as the army, labor unions and businesses) was the primary political

vehicle that led to extensive voting manipulation to favor the Suharto regime. For example, the *Opsus* unit (from *operasi khusus*, or special operations), under *Golkar*, intervened prior to the second major Indonesian elections in 1971. Civil servants such as district leaders and village heads were obliged to vote for *Golkar* by *Opsus* as they would be granted funds if they met certain *Golkar* “quotas”. All these propaganda manipulation events occurred well before the 1971 elections, and as a result, the *Golkar* party won in 1971 with a 63% vote.²⁷ Additionally, during this time frame, the Chinese population that existed even during Dutch rule was psychologically manipulated by the Suharto government and was forced to assimilate to the New Order. As a result, all but one Chinese newspaper were abolished, the last Chinese-language school shut in 1974 and Chinese were encouraged to ‘Indonesianize’ their names.²⁸

With total control, Suharto’s patronage regime to wealth had begun, and the importance of loyalty towards him was more firmly planted in 1974 when various chiefs of the armed forces who could not control social demonstrations were forced to resign. Their resignation was a result of their sympathy and support for student anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese demonstrations in the various cities. This incident, later known as the Malari incident, was embarrassing for Indonesia, and the government blamed the Socialists and *Masyumi* (umbrella term for various Muslim movements) parties for the incident. As a result, hundreds of Indonesians were put on trial for the disturbance and twelve newspapers were shutdown, making the press more cautious.²⁹ Clearly, this form of psychological manipulation by the government became engrained in Indonesian and locals would progress more cautiously over the years to come.

From 1975 – 1985, Suharto continued psychological manipulation and propaganda by slowly stripping power away from students, officers, retired officers, whomever alike, that criticized him and his government. For example, due to growing student protests against Suharto’s corruption, the government responded by creating the 1978 Campus Normalization Law that eliminated political activity at universities and resulted in another victory for Suharto. Additionally, Suharto revoked traveling privileges of various retired officers who were critical of him and banned newspapers from printing their comments or pictures. However, a healthy economy kept Suharto in a relatively respectful light, as Indonesia was seeing good rice harvest years and steady oil profits. Suharto took this opportunity to not only squelch the power of those who disagreed with him but to also spread a sole national ideological propaganda campaign through soldiers, schools, and politicians known as *Pancasila*.³⁰ *Pancasila* consisted of five

principles, which were peaceful, highly regarded, and sent a message of religious and ethnic tolerance. Unfortunately, the problem was that some leaders in the Suharto regime treated *Pancasila* as the answer to all public policy disputes, and over time saw consensus come in the form of obligatory agreements between the rulers and the ruled rather than a give-and-take relationship.³¹ Generally, unconventional symbols such as the *Pancasila* symbol seen below, are ways to stimulate certain habits and responses by people.³² With this psychological manipulation in place, Suharto became even more invincible through the 80's and most of the 90's.



*The Pancasila Symbol*³³

Interestingly, the result of his Javanese culture gave Suharto a unique subdued style of authoritarian rule, and he managed to somehow exercised power without seeming like a dictator.³⁴ As Sun Tzu states, “*Pretend inferiority and encourage his [opponents] arrogance.*”³⁵ It is important to note at this point that the Javanese culture is the largest ethnic subdivision in Indonesia and is heavily embedded with animism, mysticism and spiritualism.³⁶ As a result of this, Suharto's beliefs and his knowledge that millions of other Indonesians had similar beliefs arguably influenced Suharto's psychological tactics as a political ruler. A good example of this is the [*dukun santet*](#) example provided later.

Many of Suharto's psychological tactics were utilized not to instill political control but rather to maintain social order through a 'security approach' that entailed an enormous intelligence network in as many strata's of society as possible. To obtain this network, the Suharto regime adopted a military doctrine of *dwifungsi* or dual-function, enabling the military to

be responsible for national defense and social movements.³⁷ Additionally, Suharto unlike Sukarno, had a style of keeping Indonesia out of international affairs and superpower politics through the 80s. His initial agenda was internal economic and political stability as he perceived, followed by international accreditation, which had its place in the 90s as Indonesia began hosting various UN events and assisted in forming the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).³⁸ Internally however, the Suharto government was effectively able to dodge any challenge they faced internally through psychological manipulation, making it virtually impossible to even attempt to launch a challenge.³⁹ By becoming aware of this through time, many Indonesians became drones, and for the most part, did not wish to fight against the corruption but instead simply joined it. Fortunately, for the rest of the populace, this psychological warfare did not last for long.

Prior to being ousted in 1998, Suharto faced a lot of criticism from religious groups who believed his regime supported non-Muslims. Islam has always been so complexly entrenched in the Indonesian society that it cannot escape the political scene. Leaders such as Sukarno were always hesitant of creating an Islamic state of Indonesia due to the syncretism of Hinduism, Islam and even Christianity in the country. The wide differences and depth in religious beliefs have been a result of the stretched geography, which has given rise to individuals who take Islam seriously in an undiluted fashion (*santri* Indonesians) versus those who choose to take a blend of various religious (known as *abangan*).⁴⁰ As a result, the myriad Islamic views in Indonesia forced Suharto to somehow psychologically please his country which is about 90% Muslim.

Not wanting negative reaction from Muslims, Suharto started to perform pro-Muslim propaganda to show his tolerance of the mainstream religion. He relaxed strict regulations on Muslim political activity, relaxed restrictions on the use of the headscarf (*jilbab*) at public schools, gave more authority to Islamic courts, publicized a family pilgrimage to Mecca, funded Islamic festivals, and even recognized the state of Palestine.⁴¹ This trend continued through the 90's as Suharto replaced three leading technocrats with Muslim economists in the new cabinet of 1993, to ease religious tensions, and reduced the number of Christians in the cabinet from six to three.⁴² Additionally, Suharto was forced to implement some form of religious damage control as a result of poor public relations of one of his top military people, Gen. Benny Moerdani's, who was a devout Catholic with a harsh abhorrence of Islam. Moerdani carried out military operations to destroy political Islamists and tarnished Suharto's leadership initially.⁴³ This led

Suharto to continue setting up psychological counterbalances in favor of Islam, such as the Centre for Information and Development Studies and the Muslim run newspaper *Republika*. Interestingly, *Republika* was at the request of *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI)* or the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, to counter the Christian-run newspapers such as *Suara Pembaruan* and *Kompas*.⁴⁴ These steps were necessary to ease psychological tensions amongst religious groups in Indonesia, and to his favor, Suharto could now also keep an eye on religious groups and manipulate the media even more.

In addition to these religious tensions, a lot of prior tension against Chinese business conglomerates erupted through the 90s. An example of how Suharto psychologically manipulated people via the media in an attempt to change the negative view of Chinese conglomerates occurred in 1990 when he invited 31 conglomerate leaders to his Tapos cattle range. Here, Suharto publicized on television for the conglomerates to sell 25% of their shares to cooperatives in a way to distribute wealth and minimize the social gap that existed in Indonesia. This televised event ultimately resulted in nothing, as it was eventually agreed quietly that only 1% of shares would be transferred to cooperatives.⁴⁵ This whole incident, including various press articles in subsequent years, only shed more light onto the disparity between Chinese businessmen and the lack of Indonesian businessmen (or *pribumi's*). It gave the perception that the government always helped the Chinese linked to Suharto to succeed.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, it still revealed the potential of how Suharto manipulated an entire nation with clever politicking. Also it is important to note that today, most Indonesian-Chinese identify themselves completely as Indonesians, have Indonesian passports, and many have even had intermarriages. These demographic shifts and Indonesian pride have provided a healthy projection of a stable multicultural society that has fortunately resulted in a lot psychological restraint against public anti-Chinese behavior.

The Suharto regime eventually became well known for its kleptocracy when Suharto's children became multimillionaires by clinging to their father's reigns of power for years. The most public of his children was arguably Tommy Suharto who used psychological propaganda and his father's clout to his advantage as much as possible in the business arena.⁴⁷ The move to put his children in power made sense for two reasons. First, it successfully broke up inefficient government monopolies, which Suharto could now vicariously control through his children, and provided a healthy external image of development. Second, it allowed Suharto to dodge the

issue of not having *pribumi*'s at the same level as Chinese businesses.⁴⁸ A very creative and psychological stretch to keep a lid on his people.

By the end of the 80s, there were dozens of communication and media outlets for Indonesians. Unfortunately, these outlets vanquished only a year after Suharto lifted restrictions on freedom of expression in a campaign known as *keterbukaan*, or openness. The reason for the banning was primarily because various play's (*Sukses* to name one), foreign newspapers, Indonesian magazines and newspapers were too critical of the government. Critics perceived that the notion of *keterbukaan* was a psychological tactic to flush out the critics within Indonesian society but this remains unclear. Under the Suharto regime, most artists, poets, film producers, poets, intellectuals, students and novelists were strictly monitored, resulting in the death of ideas and preventing people from spreading their creative wings.⁴⁹ Another documented example of how the media proceeded extremely cautiously was during the Gulf War. A research study compared the New York Times coverage versus the Indonesian *Kompas* paper during the Gulf War. The study revealed that *Kompas*, under a 'developmental press' system, supported the policies of its government and "*reported the crisis in ways that helped legitimate this stand...[and]... failed to cover alleged human rights violations.*"⁵⁰

This psychological control over the media and press, and the ability to manipulate thoughts, views and ideologies continued very strongly through the 90s amongst Suharto and his loyalist. The governments main mechanism to control the entire media was through the press publication enterprise permit (SIUPP) issued by the Department of Information whose head was a Suharto loyalist and could withdraw a publications license without appealing to the courts.⁵¹ As a result, the psyche of journalists shifted towards extreme caution to avoid prosecution from the Suharto regime, and foreign journalists who were not playing by *Pancasila* and Suharto rules, were refused work permits.⁵² However with increasing pressure from the international arena and locals, the government slowly once again allowed more openness by, for example, having army generals stopping their calls to journalists discouraging unwanted reports. Additionally, Suharto allowed his children and their business to be publicly covered as a show of fairness. Despite these efforts, the whole notion of free press kept waning and waxing until finally, an official end to *keterbukaan* came in 1994 as three major publications – *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik* – were closed. Despite this, people found new avenues of information exchange such as the advancement of the Internet, where it was more challenging to control information flow.

Despite these advancements, the majority of non-Suharto loyalists still feel they were receiving one-sided polarized information.^{53 54}

Other than media propaganda and psychological manipulation, Suharto was also well known to use psyops for political gain. In particular, one of Suharto's military chiefs, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, recruited over 100 thugs in 1996 to attack the headquarter of Suharto's strongest opposition at the time, Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose political party was known as *Partai Demokrat Indonesia (PDI)* or the Indonesian Democratic Party. The psychological propaganda took a deeper twist as the thugs were supplied with PDI shirts (commonly red), to give an impression that the act was conducted by internal opposition.⁵⁵ After the incident, to recover, the military attempted to blame activists of another party known as the People's Democratic Party (PRD) as they were known to organize strikes across Java in previous years, and labeled them as followers of the outlawed Communist Party (PKI).⁵⁶ Another case that affected the PDI party through military psychological manipulation occurred a few years before in 1993 when Suharto's armed forces chief, General Feisal Tanjung, his subordinates and various people from *Bais* intervened in the mid-year PDI elections. The army forces delivered threat messages to supporters of the current leader and offered incentives for those who would elect the opponent of the current PDI leader.⁵⁷ Whether these psychological tactics helped the military and ultimately Suharto is another story, but these actions clearly reveal what was truly going on under the Suharto.

The psychological manipulation started going international with institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF in the late 90's during Suharto's overthrow. The World Bank for example, committed billions of dollars to Indonesia, and due to the economic success of Indonesia through the 80s and 90s, the 20% or so of 'leaked' money to the corrupt government became known amongst Bank officials as the 'price to pay.'⁵⁸ The psychology of the Indonesian people was clearer during the economic crises that swept Southeast Asia by the end of 1997 and all of 1998. At the end, as Thomas Friedman points out, another state did not oust Suharto, it was the global foreign investing 'supermarkets' that lost their faith in recovery and pulled their money out of the Indonesian economy.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the IMF was unable to crack the Indonesian kleptocracy. Instead, they barged into Indonesia with its position firmly fixed on market fundamentalism, misread the Indonesian situation and firmly believed that the problems were purely economic as they commonly did with all countries.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, the problem

was probably more psychological, as all foreign investors and Indonesians simply lost faith in Suharto and their psychological perceptions reinforced each other to the point where neither the IMF nor any strategy by Indonesian technocrats would help.⁶¹

The last few weeks of Suharto's rule in 1998 saw a lot of social unrest and even more psychological manipulation. Interestingly, even though the Suharto regime had suppressed the media extensively, especially from student views, the regime was unable to keep up with technology. Students were able to communicate current events unfolding in the last few days of Suharto's rule through the Internet and cellular phones, and were able to coalesce and coordinate their movements effectively. Additionally, television triggered campuses across the nation to stage simultaneous protests, a movement that psychologically affected Suharto.⁶² To counter the protests, the secret military Rose Team assembled and captured several leading protestors, few of who later testified in a press conference of being tortured and abducted by the elite team. These revelations, psychologically affected demonstrators as they stepped up their protests, and ironically the elite covert operations team who were in place to protect Suharto's regime, inadvertently helped it crumble.⁶³

The last few days of Suharto's rule in May 1998 mounted into immense psychological tension as six students were shot in Trisakti University in downtown Jakarta amidst a massive protest. Psychological manipulation was attested for these killings as reports surfaced that the bullets were from Steyr rifles, which were only issued to a handful of special police units at the time. Additionally, a report claimed that uniforms were stolen from a mobile brigade unit a few weeks prior to the incident, adding to the suspicion that military soldiers disguised as police were responsible and attempted to frame police officers. But the shootings suggest that highly skilled forces were used, as all students were either shot in the head or chest.⁶⁴ This incident was only the tip of the psychological twist that ensued during the final days of Suharto. To add to the killings, riots and looting as never seen since the days of Sukarno began, including widespread and organized rape and assault of ethnic-Chinese women in an attempt to terrorize the local Chinese population.⁶⁵ Interestingly, the communication networks in the vice-president's facility were reported jammed throughout the riots, something only the military was capable of doing. Additionally, there were reports that the military, police and fire fighting units were told not to engage by *Bais* and *Kopassus* military units, and that gangs and thugs were seen wearing military clothing and using military equipment.⁶⁶ One theory suggests that the military got involved in

these psyops to strike against the Chinese to spread greater fear amongst the mass that similar acts could be launched against them. Another suggests that there was rivalry between military generals, and a lower ranked general hoped the riots would discredit a higher ranked general and convince Suharto to appoint the former as armed forces commander or chief of a new security agency.⁶⁷ Regardless of which theory is true, it is obvious that the military had once again used psychological warfare to manipulate their own government and the people for their own motives. Finally, at the end of the entire incident in 1998, approximately 150,000 foreigners, ethnic-Chinese and the IMF team were evacuated and over 1000 Indonesians had died.⁶⁸

In the post Suharto regime (1998 – present) the military became extremely vulnerable and appeared to be back at work in performing psychological warfare with a goal to influence post-Suharto elections. While it was never proven, several retired military officials claimed that the mysterious ‘ninja killings’ of suspected black magic practitioners (*dukun santet*) in East Java during 1998, where well organized and fit military profiles of previous *Bais* operations. These killings, which later reports confirmed 182 dead, had targeted devout Muslims and where carried out to instill psychological terror and fear in the public.⁶⁹ These killings became well publicized through Indonesian media, however it was only later revealed that the military and police forces were in some way involved. The killings took on the appearance of a professionally orchestrated psychological campaign to instill terror and hysteria. While the incidents were not clearly documented, it was thought that dissident generals in the Suharto regime were waging a psychological war to weaken the interim president B.J. Habibie.⁷⁰ More shockingly, there were credible reports suggesting that the military used and placed mentally ill people in the place of the killings to implicate them as the killers. This psyops worked, as almost a dozen or so mentally ill people were killed by suspicious mobs who mistaken them for ‘ninja’s.’⁷¹

This is not to say that Suharto’s regime was never accused of being involved in any mysterious killings before 1998. In fact, in 1983 and 1984 there were an abundant amount of *Petrus*, an Indonesian acronym for *penembak misterius*, or ‘mysterious killers’ that the government repeatedly denied they had any connection with. The police chief at the time commented that the *Petrus* killings were a result of young criminals influenced by Western movies.⁷² However, the local human rights group known as Indonesian Legal Aid Institute or *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH)* claimed that the Indonesian national police and armed forces did indeed carry out thousands of mysterious deaths of ‘suspected criminals’ and ‘ex-convicts’ in

the suburbs of major cities in the mid-80s. A year leading up to these mysterious deaths, the chief of *Kopkamtib* announced publicly that the security force would focus on ‘the cause’ of the destabilizing domestic economic problems such as the rise in urban crime, crowded cities, and poverty. Additionally, specific locations such as bridges, creeks and side streets of major city market centers were picked as spots to dump bodies as a psychological warning campaign to intimidate locals.⁷³ The *Petrus* campaign, as it came to be known, was another psychological manipulation tool the government used to cleanse the city of criminals and warn locals of what could happen to them if they got involved in criminal activities.

By late 1998, when Habibie had become president, more student protests and shootings had ensued in Jakarta, and it appeared special military units were growing vulnerable internally and were not ready for a regime without Suharto. This time, it appeared *Paspampres*, who should be loyal to the president at the time, were still Suharto-loyalists, and began performing some psyops to perhaps anger or discredit the new Habibie administration. In particular, *Paspampres* apparently managed to coerce an Indonesian student to begin relaying information about student activity during the peak of more riots in late 1998.⁷⁴ It appeared Suharto still had a forceful momentum as his military loyalists continued their tradition of recruiting thugs in Jakarta and even as far away as Kupang, Timor, where a staged mob attacked local mosques in Kupang, supposedly in retaliation of ethnic riots in prior weeks. Interestingly, these riots immediately stopped when Habibie’s independent commission to investigate Suharto’s wealth dissolved.⁷⁵ The Suharto investigation was later taken up by international reports and circulated heavily in Indonesia through Time magazine which issued a large article on the Suharto family and their wealth.⁷⁶ In addition to these public psychological effects, more dire psychological tactics were used in 1999 by various competing political mobs as they began manipulating religious symbols, making peaceful election campaigns seem impossible.⁷⁷ All these psyops tools were a result of the old regime not pleased with the new regime, religious confusion amongst various party movements, and a complex web of power struggles by internal military and government officials

During Wartime

Until the 80s Suharto's government always downplayed the East Timor issue after invading the Portuguese colony in 1975. All the propaganda that indicated Timor people wished for independence were vigorously restrained by the press, making East Timor a non-issue for most Indonesians and the international community. However, East Timor started off as a small issue and then exploded as it obtained international attention in the 80s. The Indonesian government's perception to take over East Timor and the subsequent invasion, incorporation and management which followed was always conducted by military operations either overtly, through repression, or covertly through radio broadcast propaganda labeling pro-independent Timorese parties as being neo-fascist.⁷⁸ As more violence broke out in East Timor from time to time, it was clear that the campaign to instill fear and intimidation failed. As a result, Indonesian commando units entered East Timor in the 80s to support what they called anti-Communist alliances (such as Apodeti, Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), Kota and Trabalhista) against the Revolutionary Front for the Independent East Timor (Fretilin) to keep the perception that a civil war was raging. The entire incident had a setback when five journalists who were from Australian television stations were killed. The government claimed that they were collateral damage, caught in crossfire between anti-Communist alliances and Fretilin, but reports that Indonesian troops killed the journalists seems more credible.⁷⁹

Throughout the years, the Indonesian troops have used severe psyops such as forcing Timorese civilians to walk ahead of advancing Indonesian troops, forcing Fretilin soldiers to either hold or shoot civilians. These psyops tactics, along with news blackouts and banning journalists from entering East Timor during the 90s, attempted to keep East Timor from the international community. In another case, the Indonesian army deployed Timorese as paid intelligence agents which led to a high level of distrust in Timorese society, having people turn on each other, which led the government troops to perform night-time raids on homes of suspected protestors who were later killed without trial.⁸⁰ The Indonesian government always wished to wipe out the resistance and then eventually give an appearance of an integrated East Timor but has been unable to do so for years.⁸¹ While the international community, primarily the U.S. and Australia, instructed Indonesia not to abuse human rights, these countries saw the removal of

communist parties as essential and did not implement as severe economic and military sanctions as people would expect today.

As international pressure mounted, Suharto publicly apologized for certain isolated events in East Timor and replaced several people in the military to appease the public. However, his vehemence to crush Fretilin continued. For example, in 1992, the anti-Indonesian Fretilin leader, Xanana Gusmao was captured in East Timor and startled Indonesians when he stated that he accepted Indonesia's integration with East Timor on television. It was speculated that psyops had been used once again by the government, who had coerced Xanana to state these views in exchange for a lighter sentence. Later it also became known that he was prevented from reading more than two pages of his defense plea. After his trial came to an end in 1993, Xanana changed his views and supported a free East Timor once again.⁸² Indonesian military psyops continued in 1999, when more killings in East Timor were a direct result of covert operations. The operations in 1999 and prior incidences have been speculated as a means to squelch the psychology of separatist movements in other regions of Indonesia such as Aceh and Irian Jaya. Unfortunately, most of the psyops in East Timor lacked a critical component of covert operations known as 'plausible deniability'. Therefore, it became clear to the international community that an Indonesian-backed military must have been responsible for severely violating human rights in East Timor.⁸³

The U.S. has recently found itself involved with the East Timor conflict as all the carnage surfaced within the last decade. As recent as 1999, it was reported that the US provided military training under a covert program under the Clinton Administration. The operation was known as 'Iron Balance' and the training for the Indonesian *Kopassus* unit involved guerilla warfare, surveillance, counter-intelligence, and psychological operations.⁸⁴ The East Timor issue has still seen unrest even under Megawati's presidency. As early as October 2001, it was reported that *Kopassus* were carrying out a 'black operation' to capture an East Timor rebel commander, Tengku Abdullah. The reason was primarily due to the fact that U.S. companies such as Exxon-Mobil had increasing security concerns in the East Timor region where it operated. The Indonesian military saw this request as a blessing in disguise and a great opportunity to use additional covert operations.⁸⁵

Psyops Performed on Indonesia

The Western Allies

It is known that the various Western nations have engaged in psychological warfare in Indonesia during its recent history. Most of the covert operations (including psyops) during the Sukarno time period (1947-1965) was conducted by the U.S. and was due to the fact that the U.S. lacked confidence in Sukarno and his strange democratic view.⁸⁶ One case illustrating this point was the continual covert military aid by the U.S. to Indonesia's rebels despite negative public remarks from Sukarno regarding U.S. aid. Furthermore, it is known that in 1965, fear of a pro-Community Party (PKI) outburst was circulated by an underground pamphlet by CIA assets in the Indonesian Socialist Party known as *Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)*. An article from a former CIA officer, Ralph McGehee, explained how the psychological propaganda was initiated as it stated the following:

“Media fabrications played a key role in stirring up popular resentment against the PKI. Photographs of the bodies of the dead generals – badly decomposed – were featured in all the newspapers and on television.... This cynically manufactured campaign was designed to foment public anger against the Communists...”⁸⁷

Another documented occurrence of covert operations performed on Indonesia occurred during the Eisenhower administration, when the U.S. was skeptical of Sukarno's push towards a legitimate democratic Indonesia. Subsequently, on the basis of flawed information from the CIA, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles, provided covert military assistance to Indonesian rebels against the government in 1957-1958. After this covert operation failed, the US changed its views and backed the Indonesian government in an unexpected campaign against the rebels they were originally assisting.⁸⁸ Additionally, the U.S. pressured their Indonesian military contacts publicly through journals and the press to extinguish PKI initiatives.⁸⁹ Despite the outcome, these interventions left a lasting psychological impression on Indonesians and the Suharto government that followed.

Globalization

Embedded in the complex political psychological manipulation during Indonesia's recent history has been the psychological pressure towards Western globalization. By the end of the

90s, Indonesia was indeed struck by the Microchip Immune Deficiency Syndrome (MIDS) virus as suggested by Thomas Friedman. Friedman claims that Indonesia has the rudimentary hardware infrastructure to support technology but lacks the mindset to continuously keep its ‘software’ current. He defines MIDS as a political disease that is brought about by countries not inoculating themselves with technology to create a faster and open marketplace.⁹⁰ By the mid-to-late 90s, this so-called virus struck most of Asia, which was part of the reason for the economic crisis in 1997. For Indonesia, the Minister of Research and Technology responsible to keep Indonesia up to date through most of Suharto’s time was B.J. Habibie. Unfortunately, many of Habibie’s projects came under criticism as all of them put together accounted for almost half of the losses reported by Indonesia’s state-owned companies in the 90s.⁹¹

In addition to the government, Indonesia’s corporations have also always attempted to project a Western psychological image of advancement. For example, when Nike left Japan since it was too expensive, facilities for the shoe manufacturer mushroomed throughout Southeast Asia in the 90s.⁹² Additionally, Indonesia’s leading car manufacturer known as Astra, wanted to ‘follow the American way of doing business’ and attempt to shift its psychological culture from profligacy to a transparent market niche player – a tough battle under Suharto no doubt.⁹³ Unfortunately, the globalization pressure is one Indonesia will face for a long time, but it is a healthy pressure that will continue to contribute in ousting non-democratic leaders, and is unavoidable. Friedman attests to this globalization pressure in Indonesia. He claims, through his personal experience and interviews, that young working class Indonesians in their 20s and 30s have a common notion of wanting to get rich, but in a democratic and non-corrupt manner. Unfortunately, these same people knew that under Suharto, his loyalists and long existing crony businessmen, democracy would not exist. However, instead of taking to the streets like their fellow mobsters, they took to the global system strategy. This strategy, perhaps conscious or not, was to do everything possible to integrate Indonesia into the global technological and Western system through global institutions like the World Trade Organization, Pizza Hut, PricewaterhouseCoopers and McDonald’s. By doing this, the young working middle class were trying to import democratic, legal and better international standards from beyond rather than from above, within the Indonesian government.⁹⁴ This interesting psychological shift arguably led to Indonesian reevaluating itself, which resulting in the ousting of Suharto and other leaders in the government.

Growing Anti-Western Sentiments and Terrorism

As the world becomes more interconnected, more clashes between non-western and Western societies have risen and will continue to cause psychological manipulative struggles. At a psychological level, these different views are a result of the different social structures in non-western and Western society. Traditionally, it is known that Western social structures are based on individualism, personal freedom and independence while non-western social structures have been based on collectivism where behaviors and opinions are shared. In fact, various scholars have studied this phenomenon, and one study found that societies of the Asia-Pacific region (including Indonesia), reflect a collective pattern of behavior where interpersonal (in-group) interactions take precedent over personal (individual) domains as found in the Western communities.⁹⁵ This collectivism is a result of Indonesia's historical village-type society, that still exist in many ways, where individuals are members of a larger group and certain freedoms are restricted while social individualism, as seen in Western democracies, is somewhat frowned upon.⁹⁶

Additionally, it is important to understand that unlike Western societies, there have traditionally been psychological clashes between local urban and local rural (village) societies within Indonesia. Village societies continue to be somewhat distasteful of their urban Indonesian counterparts and feel those in the city have turned *kasar* or course, in attempts to follow Western ways.⁹⁷ It seems this clash between the modernists and traditionalists has led to great economic gaps and more political instability. These older views along with political shifts in the past few years suggests that Indonesians are generally seeking parts of a Westernized way of life as they perceive it, which is the elimination of social gradations and an emancipated social structure while still preserving their heritage.

These social psychological struggles, has resulted in human civilizations engaging in the ultimate psychological operational war of all time – terrorism. Terrorism is unfortunately not completely a military war but is more of a psychological war. Indonesia plays, and will continue to play, a huge role in this war. Indonesia has seen its recent waves of anti-American and anti-western sentiments, such as threats to local international schools and the explosions in popular Western nightspots in Bali on October 2002. It is clear that these modern types of suicide attacks

are being carried out to produce a negative psychological effect because they are taking place in locations that will guarantee the media as a force multiplier.⁹⁸ These tragic events are unfortunately the result of deep-rooted psychological views that some Islamic extremists have. The scary element is that these sentiments are growing more everyday in Indonesia, not by Islamic hard-liners but by commoners. This is arguably a result of not being able to adapt fast enough to the Western world both technologically and culturally, resulting in a psychological trauma. One can only speculate that this trauma is due to the fact that Indonesian's feel their culture, as they know, is slowly dissolving. A great example of where this is occurring is Bali. Bali is a world-renowned paradise, and *Pura Tanah Lot*, a beautiful Hindu temple built on the coast of Bali, is a place that draws millions of tourists and locals. Less than a hundred yards away is a resort with an enormous golf course and the local newspaper *Jakarta Post* carried several stories depicting this contrast as a cultural self-destructive path.⁹⁹ This is just one example of hundreds where the sterile global McDonald's culture is encroaching its way into an already emotional Indonesian psyche. However, in an optimistic view, the web has empowered more people than ever before to speak and think more freely, which has enabled people in various parts of the world to converse and gain a mutual respective tolerance of different views and beliefs.¹⁰⁰

Anti-western sentiments have played a big role in various strata's of Indonesia. The role of the IMF for example has continued to aid in anti-western sentiments. In particular, the poor Western image continued in 1998 as a picture during the signing ceremony between Indonesia and the IMF showed Michael Camdessus (an IMF managing director) with a stern face and arms crossed, towering over a humiliated Suharto. Being aired across the country, this had a negative psychological effect, as it appeared Indonesia was being forced to sign the document and submit to Western demands.¹⁰¹ This indignity, coupled with how the U.S. and other developed countries can ignore IMF advice has undoubtedly created negative psychological sentiments towards the Western world. An example of when the U.S. blatantly ignored the IMF, and could get away with it, occurred during the Clinton administration. During this time the IMF gave their predictable formula to increase interest rates to counter the lowest inflation in decades, but due to the economic boom and all the people prospering in the U.S., the Clinton administration and the Federal Reserve simply ignored the IMF Article 4 evaluations.¹⁰² Another appalling incident occurred when the IMF forced Indonesia to abolish subsidies of food and kerosene

while wages were falling and unemployment rising during the Indonesian economic crisis.¹⁰³ Also, when the crisis hit Indonesia at its worst, the American firms that had been encouraged to enter the country by Clinton at the 1994 APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit, were pressured by the U.S. government to have the Indonesian government fulfill their contracts. A sympathetic negotiating may have been a better psychological alternative for the developing nation but the U.S. refused to do this when it was most required.¹⁰⁴

In addition to American imperialism, Indonesian locals as a result of years of government distorted media, have undoubtedly turned anti-American. An example of this is during the Gulf War when *Kompas* omitted various elements of Western operations during the Gulf crisis, such as the importance of Kuwait's sovereignty. This indubitably led to Indonesians feeling that Americans and their Allies were using military force to obtain Western political and economic interests.¹⁰⁵ More recently however, the US has realized that the war against terrorism has a lot to do with words and various psychological components. In October 2001, the Bush administration for example, engaged in various psyops through a 'war of words' to win the hearts and minds of Muslims, primarily through Middle East television networks and dropping leaflets in Afghanistan detailing friendly messages.¹⁰⁶

Overall, one plausible long-term cure to terrorism is the game of conversing, but more importantly, conversing with different peoples and cultures. It is arguable, through conversing, people gain social tolerance, sensitivity and awareness. It is this art of conversing that humans will need to evolve going forward to ensure cross-culture harmony and eradicate terrorism. Theodore Zeldon pontificates that so few people engage in conversation these days with a desire to emerge as a slightly different person. He claims that conversing with people we have nothing in common with is worth pursuing, and that the cross-cultural encounters not only "*reshuffles the cards, it creates new cards.*"¹⁰⁷ An example of how cross-cultural interests and conversing does not occur today is the unfortunate reality of how most American's prior to the Bali blasts probably had no clue where it was on a map, let alone cared to find out, and that it was a part of Indonesia. Unfortunately, the xenophobic nature of people and language barriers has made cross-cultural conversing difficult, as humans by nature, fear the unknown. However, there is no better time than now to converse with those religious fundamentalists to understand their thoughts and actions.

Conclusion

In the last 50 years or so, Indonesia has seen an abundant amount of well-documented psychological operations. Various imaginative psyops carried out by and on the Indonesian military have come in the form of deploying ‘agents’ or ‘network managers’ to gather information; noncooperating weapons such as the news media; and even public relations campaigns.¹⁰⁸ Effective marketing campaigns by media control and censorship have been excessively used in Indonesia’s history. This has enabled the government to change the psychographics of people, which refers to attitudes, values, lifestyles, and opinions of local people.¹⁰⁹ One can argue that today the climate in Indonesia is tense and people have a high level of mistrust and paranoia as a result of the all the psyops and propaganda that has been conducted on them.

During the Sukarno regime, Indonesia saw a lot of psyops intervention from the U.S. as a means of suppressing Communism. In 1965, when Suharto took over, Indonesia performed an abundant amount of internal psyops as a means of obtaining social order as perceived by the Suharto New Order. This administration implemented severe restraint on the press along with excessive military psyops to keep anti-governments movements at bay. Unfortunately, Indonesia was infested with more killings and psyops during the administration after Suharto, as Habibie was unable to bridge perceptions that he was not a puppet of Suharto. Nonetheless, after the third president, Abdurrahman Wahid and current president Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia is nibbling its way to a democratic society.

A lot of psyops from external influences such as Western media and organizations will play a large role in Indonesia, in terms of cross-cultural social tolerances and the war against terrorism. For this reason, the U.S. has a deep-rooted national security interest in Indonesia and must continue to seek Indonesia as a partner. While much work has been done on psyops in Indonesia, there still remains a lot to be documented. Useful future psyops work could involve the maritime security issues and how the government has dealt with the issues regarding the Exclusive Economic Zones by the ASEAN countries. Future work could investigate Indonesian psyops in dealing with the maritime responsibilities in these zones including control of smuggling, pirates, illegal immigrants and polluting vessels.¹¹⁰

Annotated Bibliography

* Note: All Scientific Journals (A-Z) on George Washington University's online 'Aladin' facility were researched. The research followed a two phased approach. The first phase consisted of doing word searches in all the journals. The following words or a combination of them were searched: *psyops*, *propaganda*, *psychological operations*, *perception management*, *psychological warfare*, and *Indonesia*. The second phase consisted of skimming the hits obtained in the first phase for relevant articles as it related to the paper.

Published Journals, Periodicals, Magazines and Web searches

1. Kahin, Audrey R. and Kahin, George McT. (1995). Review of *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*. *Journal of American History* 1996 83(1).

This is a very interesting book review of foreign policy subversion used during the Eisenhower administration in Indonesia. It discusses various failed, short-term and long-term covert operations. In particular it discusses how the Dulles brothers (top CIA officials), undermined CIA reports that Indonesia's president at the time, Sukarno, was in control of Indonesia. As a result the Dulles brothers launched a secret military campaign in 1957 to train, fund, and arm rebel forces in Sulawesi and Sumatra. This article reveals some US role is military psyops within Indonesia and bears relevance to the paper.

2. Kivimaki, Timo (1993). *Strength of Weaknesses: American-Indonesian Hegemonic Bargaining*. *Journal of Peace Research* 1993 30(4).

This article discusses the power struggle that exists between weak and strong countries. It discusses the difference between 'power' and 'bargaining power' and how Indonesia has used bargaining power as a political strategy. Various models of hegemonic order are incorporated to discuss differences in power between weak and strong countries, Indonesia and the US military assistance in particular. This article is somewhat relevant to the paper, as strategic bargaining power is a very subtle form of psyops that both Indonesian governments and US used, and still do today, towards national policy and security.

3. Brands, H. W., Jr. (1989). *The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn't Topple Sukarno*. *Journal of American History* 1989 76(3).

This is a great article that looks into US-Indonesia relations during the Sukarno era. It discusses how intrusive the US was in attempted to overthrow Sukarno using overt diplomatic operations and covert military tactics by helping the Indonesian military. It also discusses the dicey relations that existed between the US and Indonesia in the 50's and 60's and how some propaganda and psyops were used by Indonesia in the "crush Malaysia" campaign which confused the US even more. This article is very informative and substantiates a lot of information for the paper.

4. Scott, Peter Dale (1985). *The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967*. *Pacific Affairs [Canada]* 1985 58(2).

This article discusses the controversial coup that occurred in 1965 to overthrow Sukarno. While there is not much documentation about what occurred during that time, the article discusses the controversies, widespread paranoia, and conspiratorial policies that ensued during that time. Interestingly it also discusses the links the Indonesian military at the time had with the US, British, German and Japanese intelligence and how it reinforced the overthrow of Sukarno. A wonderful article in terms of understanding first documented psyops cases in Indonesia and how the duplicitous Suharto himself might have been part of the coup.

5. Soewarjo (1971). *Psychology in Indonesia*. Zeitschrift fuer Experimentelle und Angewandte Psychologie. Vol. 18(4) 1971.

This article emphasizes the impact on Indonesian psychology by the Dutch for military officer selection. This is relevant to the paper as many powerful Indonesian generals were trained and psychologically disciplined under Dutch methodologies. The influence of this nation, including German-US training is very strong and impacts how operations (psyops included) are conducted in Indonesia.

6. Margolin, Leo J. (1946). *Paper bullets: a brief story of psychological warfare in World War II*.

While this article provides useful insight into the definition of psywar and how it was used in WWII, it does not provide a lot of information of psyops in Indonesia. It does touch upon Japanese propaganda that was heavily influenced upon Indonesia during Japanese occupation. The article attests to successful propaganda initiatives by Germany that led to population fear and counter US psyops that assisted in the defeat of the Germans. Unfortunately, this article is not extremely useful in research for psyops in Indonesia.

7. Jones, Matthew (1999). "Maximum Disavowable Aid": Britain, the United States and the Indonesian Rebellion, 1957-1958. *English History Review* 1999 114 (459).

This article discussing the military aid the US and its Allies provided Indonesia during an anti-Sukarno rebellion. It gives credible information about CIA covert operations to aid rebel forces in the outer islands of Indonesia against the Communist Party (PKI). It discusses foreign policy and its impact on the attitude and confidence of leaders in Indonesia and the US. As it relates to the paper, this article discusses a lot of covert operations but discusses very little psyops that ensued during this time. This is also unfortunately a result of not much documentation existing during that time frame.

8. Conboy, Kenneth and Morrison, James (1999). Review of *Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957-1958*. *Journal of Military History* 2000 64 (3).

This short book review discusses US involvement of the CIA covert operations in Indonesia in 1957 and 1958. This review discusses the richness in detail of the book during that time, including policies implemented, but does not discuss much in the form of psyops in Indonesia.

9. Soesilo, Arie S. and Wasburn, Philo C. (1994). *Constructing a Political Spectacle: American and Indonesian Media Accounts of the "Crisis in the Gulf."* *Sociological Quarterly* 1994 35 (2).

This is a very interesting article that discusses how western free press media (*New York Times*) reported the Gulf Crisis versus the widely circulated Indonesian developmental media, *Kompas*. It weighed importance, balance, and framing of the news coverage and provides insight as to how the newspapers varied. As it relates to the paper, this journal is particularly useful as it allows us to see how psychologically manipulative different newspapers can be as it relates to their government's interests and their own.

10. Sagaria, Mary Ann D. (2000). *Constructions of Feminism in Unequal Relationships: A Personal Account from a North American in a Cross-cultural Household*. *National Women's Studies Association Journal* 12.1 2000.

This article discusses the psychological implications that women face in unequal power relationships of cross-cultural household settings in Indonesia. Specifically, the author describes the Indonesian setting, reconstructs a typical workday and recreates three incidents as it relates to household gender work roles, birth control and marriage. While this has some interesting insights into the women psychology in Indonesia, it does not provide useful information in the context of psyops and information warfare.

11. Stubbs, Richard (1990). *Canada's Relations with Malaysia: Picking Partners in ASEAN*. Pacific Affairs 1990 63 (3).

In the 80s, Canada sought to increase relations with Asia. This paper discusses and reviews Canada's relationship with Malaysia where it has traditionally had closest links. It discusses Canada's foreign policy and how Canada initially picked Malaysia as its partner but then abandoned them in favor of Indonesia which eventually led up to ill-coordinated bilateral relationships with other ASEAN nations. Unfortunately, this article focuses only on international policy and does not focus on any psyops as it relates to Indonesia.

12. Stubbs, Richard (1992). *Subregional Security Cooperation in ASEAN: Military and Economic Imperatives and Political Obstacles*. Asian Survey 1992 32 (5).

This article discusses how the different ASEAN countries have started to establish security and economic environments. The article argues that the trends will produce strains in the ASEAN grouping in terms of security and economic imperatives. As it relates to Indonesia, this article discusses Indonesian military ties in the 90s being established between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia for national security. While the article does not touch on psyops, it is somewhat relevant to the paper as it discusses continued security and information exchange services between various ASEAN countries.

13. Scott, Summer (1972). *The Challenge to American Corporate Investment in Indonesia*. Asian Survey 1972 12 (5).

In this article the investment environment of Indonesia during that timeframe is analyzed. It discusses the obstacles, advantages and disadvantages that foreign investors could potentially face in years to come. Summer discusses how Indonesia's foreign policy would play a vital role in the Pacific in years to come in terms of mutual economic and investment opportunities between the US and Indonesia. As it relates to the paper, this article sheds minimal light on psyops in Indonesia, and takes on the form of an academic economic review as it discusses Indonesia's Foreign Investment Law in detail.

14. Homan, Gerlof D. (1990). *The Netherlands, the United States and the Indonesian Question, 1948*. Journal of Contemporary History 1990 25 (1).

This article discusses the relationship between the Dutch, Indonesia and US during Indonesia's independence. It discusses why countries ignored certain policies at times and who Indonesia was not a consideration for the US until much later. It also goes into how Indonesia formed itself as a Republic and the foreign conflicts that ensued between the Dutch and the US leading up to the Hague convention. Unfortunately, this article does not discuss much of any psyops that occurred during and just after Indonesia's independence, and as a result is not extremely relevant to the paper.

15. Bradbury, J.H. (1985). *International Movements and Crisis in Resource Orientated Companies: The Case of Inco in the Nickel Sector*. Economic Geography 1985 61 (2).

The article examines the over-expansion of firms into East Asia, with a focus on one large Nickel firm known as INCO (Canadian based firm) in Indonesia and Guatemala. It is an academic economics paper discussing the economic crisis in the 60s involving unstable profit rates, and expansion-contraction strategies in Canada, which made them explore operations Third World countries. Unfortunately, this article is an in-depth discussion on the Nickel industry as it pertains to INCO and does not discuss psychological effects or any psyops by this company in Indonesia.

16. Cohen, Warren I. (1983). *Cold Wars and Shell Games: The Truman Administration and East Asia*. *Reviews in American History* 1983 11 (3).

This article gives insight into US relations with several countries in Asia especially China during the Truman years. It discusses foreign policy towards China, Korea and other Asian countries with some emphasis on Indonesia. Unfortunately, this article is not useful in terms of psyops in Indonesia as its focus is mostly outside the realm of Indonesia.

17. Cohen, Warren I. (1988). Review of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Vol. XII, Pt. II: East Asia and the Pacific*. *The Journal of American History* 1988 75 (3).

This book review discusses how the US supported anti-Communist efforts throughout Southeast Asia. It briefly claims how the US's attempt to make friends with Indonesia during the 50s was not successful. This article is not very beneficial towards the paper as no psyops in Indonesia is discussed.

18. Rusnok, Richard M. Jr., 2dLt. (1998). *Psychological Operations...From the Sea*. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 1998 124 (7).

This short article discusses the lack of psyops in the Navy. The article gives analogous psyops examples in other US military units, defines various psyops terms and gives some history of psyops used in World War II. More importantly, it discusses the economic advantages of using psyops in the navy. Unfortunately, this article does not provide any insight into Indonesia so is not really relevant to the paper.

19. Dadkhah, Asghar; Harizuka, Susumu; Mandal, Manas K. (1999). *Pattern of Social Interaction in Societies of the Asia-Pacific Region*. *Journal of Social Psychology* 1999 139 (6).

This article discusses a social interaction structure to find out how different cultures interacted socially. The three social interactions consisted of interpersonal, personal, and extrapersonal and the authors examined 15 countries. The results determined that participants in different cultural groups interact more within their in-group domain. While Indonesia was reflected in this study, this article does not go into psyops in Indonesia. It does however contain some relevant date of cultural interactions which is an important factor when discussing psyops so this article is minimally useful for the paper.

20. Cameron, Lisa A. (1999). *Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia*. *Economic Inquiry* 1999 37 (1).

This is an economic experiment conducted in Indonesia that rejects standard game-theoretic predictions. The reason Indonesia is chosen in the economic 'ultimatum game' is due to the fact that higher monetary incentives can be used and judges the behavior of peoples economic decisions which concludes that proposer behavior is mostly invariant to stake changes. While this article gives some insight into Indonesian behavior and psychology, it is not relevant to psyops in Indonesia and is hence not very useful for the paper.

21. Van Der Korean, Justus M. (1983). Review of *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. *The American Historical Review* 1983 88 (3).

This book review discusses that the book *The Road to Power* is a useful tool in understanding the Indonesian military in the 40s, 50s and 60s. The book discusses the Sukarno era, the mysterious coup of 1965 and the power of conflicts in Indonesia during that time period. Unfortunately, there is not much discussion of psyops and in the review and was therefore not examined for the purposes of the paper.

22. Van Der Kroef, Justus M. (1985). "*Petrus*": *Patterns of Prophylactic Murder in Indonesia*. *Asian Survey* 1985 25 (7).

This article discusses the mysterious killings that swept through certain parts of Indonesia during the 80s and the respective people involved. It discusses how the Indonesian military may have been involved and how the press was involved in discussing the killings. This article heavily discusses the possibility of psyops used by the Indonesian military on Indonesians and as a result is extremely relevant to the paper.

23. Van Der Kroef, Justus M. (1959). *Indonesia's Economic Future*. *Pacific Affairs* 1959 32 (1).

This article takes a deep look into Indonesia's economic situation after receiving independence. It examines the governmental inefficiencies and various regulations and policies past during that period in Indonesia. It discusses the expansion of governmental control over the entire nation, their movement away from the Dutch, and the growing role of the Indonesian military. This article puts into context some of the psychology that Indonesia has today and is therefore somewhat relevant to the psyops that Indonesia has carried out in recent history.

24. Van Der Kroef, Justus M. (1960). *The Changing Pattern of Indonesia's Representative Government*. *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 1960 26 (2).

This article discusses the anti-western view of democracy during Sukarno's presidency in Indonesia. It probes into why Sukarno felt western-style democracy failed in Indonesia and why a 'guided democracy' was required. This paper discusses more historic origins of Indonesia's independence and has limited information of psyops in Indonesia. It does shed some light into Indonesia's psychology during that time frame and is therefore somewhat useful to the paper.

25. Van Der Kroef, Justus M. (1958). *The Role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics*. *The Western Political Quarterly* 1958 11 (1).

This article examines Islam in Indonesia as a religious that has brought about important impulses of development to Indonesians and an ideological rationale to the country. It probes Islam as a national doctrine amplifier and the psychological role of religion in terms of political action. This article is relevant to the paper as it investigates the importance of religion as a psychological tool in Indonesia in the 50s and 60s, many views of which still remain in the country.

26. Van Der Kroef, Justus M. (1957). *Instability in Indonesia*. *The Far Eastern Economic Review* 1957 26 (4).

This article discusses the political instability in Indonesia during the 50s and Sukarno's claim that western democracy failed in Indonesia. It discusses the military inception in public life which specific accounts of what various top military officials did during that time. It discusses various protests, rebellions and general animosity that existed in the public during that time frame. As such, it is a relevant snap shot of the psychology imbedded in the Indonesian society at that time, and is somewhat relevant to the paper.

27. Van Der Kroef, Justus M. (1952). *Society and Culture in Indonesia*. *American Journal of Sociology* 1952 58 (1).

This article examines the social trauma Indonesia faced post independence. It discusses the type of psychological social cohesion required, other than Islam and traditional village culture, to provide new social structure. It discusses the characteristics of Indonesian nationalism during the 50s and thus is a relevant discussion in discovering more about the war-destroyed colony's psyche. It is therefore somewhat relevant to the paper.

28. Van Der Kroef, Justus M. (1955). *Folklore and Tradition in Javanese Society*. The Journal of American Folklore 1955 68 (267).

This article discusses how Javanese culture, the largest ethnic subdivision in Indonesia, is a culmination of various religious such as Hinduism, Islam and even western culture. This topic is relevant as Suharto is Javanese and many of his psyops during his rule was possibly influenced by his background and culture. As such it is a very relevant topic to the paper on psyops in Indonesia.

29. *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, “psychological warfare” and “propaganda” [on-line] (Chicago, Illinois, No update available); accessed from <http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=63289>; Internet.

These few pages provide great definitions of psychological warfare and propaganda and how they relate to each other. These definitions substantiate the definitions in the paper and are very relevant in forming the context of the paper.

30. Pereira, Derwin (October 31, 2001). *Elite troops hunt Aceh rebel chief*. The Straits Times (Singapore). Lexis-Nexis.

This article is highly relevant to the paper as it discusses the involvement of Indonesia's elite Security Forces who are trained in psychological warfare in East Timor as recent as 2001. It discusses the target of the elite force to hunt and capture a top-notch rebel known as Tengku Abdullah

31. Kiefer, Francine and Tyson, Ann Scott (October 17, 2001). *In war of words, US lags behind*. The Christian Science Monitor. Lexis-Nexis.

This article discusses the propaganda and efforts the Bush administration was using to step up its efforts in the hearts and minds of the Muslim world, including Indonesia. It discusses psyops waged by the US in Afghanistan to underscore the message of friendship. This attitude from the Bush administration is relevant to the paper as it discusses a direct example of how psyops is being used on the Muslim world.

32. Vulliamy, Ed and Barnett, Antony (September 19, 1999). *US aided butchers of Timor; Exclusive: Washington trained death squads in secret while Britain has continued to help Indonesian army*. The Observer. Lexis-Nexis.

This article discusses the continual guidance and assistance of the US military provided to the Indonesian Special Forces. It briefly substantiates that the US has trained the Indonesian army with psyops capabilities also. The recent involvement of the US and the covert operations by the elite Indonesian military in East Timor makes this highly relevant to the paper.

33. Hua, Lee Siew (August 13, 1998). *US Maintains cautious ties with Abri*. The Straits Times (Singapore). Lexis-Nexis.

This article discusses how the US continued to maintain ties with the military during the economic crisis in Indonesia. It also substantiates that the US provided training to Indonesian troops in psyops and other guerilla warfare tactics. The continual aid and support to the Indonesian army even during rough times in the late 90s is relevant to the paper even though the discussion of psyops is not in depth.

34. Hollingsworth, Mark (April 8, 2000). *Secrets and Spies*. The Guardian (London). Lexis-Nexis.

This article discusses the British secret service and various forms of its information warfare tactics including psyops. It substantiates the British involvement in the overthrow of Sukarno by MI6. This article is not extremely relevant to the paper as the article is a discussion on British operations all over the world and does not focus on Indonesia.

35. Hickey, Jennifer G. (November 12, 2001). *Winning Hearts and Minds*. Insight on the News. (Lexis-Nexis).

This article discusses the ‘war of words’ that the Bush administration launched in 2001 in an attempt to sway the Muslim world towards the US. Unfortunately, this article goes into generic areas of the world where the US has used psyops and does not mention Indonesia. It does, however, mention that the US needs to become more sensitive to Muslim countries as it wages its terrorist war.

36. Blank, Jonah; Whitelaw, Kevin; and Thoenes, Sander (May 25, 1998). *Suharto soldiers may also be his judges*. US News & World Report. Lexis-Nexis.

This article discusses the 1998 May riots in Indonesia during Suharto’s ousting. It discusses the repression of the Indonesian military and its ‘dual function’ role along with the psyops training it has received from the Pentagon. The article unfortunately, does not discuss in detail any psyops that may have been used during the May riots and is therefore only somewhat relevant to the paper.

37. Kondaki, Christopher D. (September 2001), *Suicide Terrorism, an Age-Old Weapon, Adds Technology*. Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Policy. Lexis-Nexis.

This article discusses terrorism as a psychological warfare tool. It alludes to Indonesia and how suicide bombing have been used in Indonesia’s past. It discusses the general concept of modern suicide terrorism, motivations behind and some possible defenses. This is a very interesting article and re-emphasizes various points in the paper.

38. Moreau, Ron and Elliott, Donna (November 23 1998). *Mystery of the Ninja Assassins*. Newsweek, Atlantic Edition, Asia. Lexis-Nexis.

This article further elaborates on the mysterious ‘Ninja assassinations’ which occurred in rural Java in the late 90s. It discusses the high possibility of military psyops involvement, which took on a campaign and system killing spree to incite fear and terror. This article is highly relevant to the paper and substantiates a lot of information from other sources written in the paper.

39. Teleki, Istvan S. *Psychological Warfare; as against Hungarians in Romania* [on-line] (no location, no update available); available from <http://www1.mimn.net/~graczar/psycholo.htm>; Internet.

This on-line source discusses basic concepts of psyops such as black, gray, and white psyops. It provides useful definitions of strategic and tactical psyops and provides examples of psyops used in Romania. While this web source does not have any information on Indonesia it does provide useful definitions of the colors of psyops which are from other credible sources. As such, it is relevant to forming the context of paper.

40. Howstuffworks, “*The Perception of Rarity*,” available from <http://www.howstuffworks.com/framed.htm?parent=diamond.htm&url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/A17778-2001Apr28.html>; Internet; accessed 28 September 2002.

This on-line source provides easy explanation for numerous day-to-day events, scenarios, and technology we encounter everyday. The source has an interesting discussion on diamonds and how their perception of rarity is a human creation given the fact that diamonds are not rare at all. This is a great example of how psychological manipulation through the media can be used by marketing firms (De Beers in the case), to reap profits for ignorant people.

41. “*Garuda Pancasila*” available from <http://home.wanadoo.nl/hbruch/garuda.html>; Internet; accessed December 13, 2002.

This site provides a clear picture of the national symbol during Suharto rule – the Garuda Pancasila.

Published Books

1. Lovelock, Christopher (2000). *Services Marketing: People, Technology, and Strategy*. New Jersey, USA: Prentice Hall.

A very thorough book discussing basic marketing concepts such as the 4 P's (pricing, promotion, product, place). Additional topics include targeting and managing customers and relationships globally. The book also discusses some conceptions of marketing warfare such as "perception gap" and "psychographics". As related to the paper, there are critical components in understanding psyops in business and how it may impact us on a daily basis, particularly in a country such as Indonesia, where businesses and people are attempting to stabilize in a post-colonial regime.

2. Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002). *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York, New York, USA: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.

This book describes the shortcomings of the IMF and World Bank in global economic policy and procedure making. It is highly insightful in terms of the false promises these global institutions make and provides a detail discussion of how the Fund and the Bank failed in their attempt to stabilize the economic crisis melt down in Asia in 1998. Stiglitz eloquently articulates how a combination of first world arrogance, pure economic theory and misunderstanding of cultures, psyche and real life economics resulted in bad decisions being made for developing countries – including Indonesia.

3. Denning, Dorothy (1999). *Information Warfare and Security*. New York, New York, USA: Association for Computer Press.

This is a great starting guide for information warfare and provides some very interesting anecdotes. Some topics discussed include the theory of information warfare in general and how it is adopted in battle. A lot is discussing on offensive tactics such as seizing signals, perception management, and cyber-security. Other elements of security analyzed are defensive tactics involving codes, physical security and monitoring. This book provides a really good workable definition of psyops for the paper along with some interesting anecdotes of various types of psyops that have been used in the past.

4. Friedman, Thomas L. (2000). *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York, New York, USA: Anchor Books, A Division of Random House Inc.

For those who wish to understand the how and why of globalization this is an excellent start. Friedman brilliantly investigates how the post Cold War has been replaced by a highly technologically advanced capitalistic system with no walls separating nations any longer. Friedman draws from his own experiences as well as other people he has interviewed and discussed the conflict the slow world nations and fast world nations are in bridges their differences in culture, psychology, and tradition. As related to the paper, Friedman discusses Indonesia's cultural, political and religious struggles and the slowing impacts it has on the nation to keep up with the rest of the world.

5. Schwarz, Adam (1999). *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*. Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin.

This book is a great guide to Indonesia up until former Indonesia's leader Soeharto. It starts with a fairly good discussion of colonial times Indonesia, the struggle for independence, and extensive growth during post-colonial and communist rule. Additionally, the book goes into great depth about the corruption, collusion and nepotism embedded in all levels of government and business in Indonesia. By discussing these fragile areas, Schwarz goes into the psychology of Indonesia of why officials grew into corrupt entities, and the impact it has had on the nation's culture, social rights and religious instability. Schwarz also discusses a lot about military psyops used by the Soeharto regime to control the Indonesian populous. This book is also extremely useful in terms of the paper as it draws from a lot of local Indonesian publications and either substantiates or refutes it with what international press was witnessing.

- Nichols, Randy K., Ryan, Daniel J., and Ryan, Julie J.C.H (2000). *Defending Your Digital Assets against Hackers, Crackers, Spies & Thieves*. USA: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

While this book provides excellent information about digital security concepts, it does not discuss much psyops. This book is more for people interested in protecting, detecting and correcting their online information through practical countermeasures such as physical security, cryptography and methods of deployment. As it relates to the paper, this book provides some useful general insights into information warfare tactics, digital espionage but very little in regards to psychological operations in defending digital information. One useful element is that this book provides a lot of references to other material relevant in the security industry.

- O'Rourke, Kevin (2002). *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia*. Maryborough, Australia: Allen & Unwin.

A fantastic book that details the political and psychological hubris, tyranny and melee of Indonesia's elite. It removes Indonesia's veil and uncovers the how the government and its link to business cronies and the military, drove a nation from poverty to growth to complete economic instability. As it relates to the paper, the book goes into great depth of the religious struggle for domination in the government and how this has affected the psychology of millions of Muslims. Additionally, the paper discusses government censorship control, purposeful misinformation by the government, and military psyops in Aceh and East Timor. This book has a lot of references and translates a lot of articles from local Indonesian newspapers which are later either refuted or substantiated by other international press papers. A great book for those interested in information psyops and Indonesia.

- Tzu, Sun translated by Griffith, Samuel B. (1971). *The Art of War*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

This book is interesting from a psyops perspective in the sense that it discusses the philosophy, motive and means of war. It is interesting as one can draw similarities from an individual who wrote of war thousands of years ago and has still to this day influenced the way the Chinese and Japanese in particular think of war. As it relates to the paper, Sun Tzu does go into the psychological elements of war such as false information and perceptions. He discusses his belief that a successful speedy victory is based on strategy, intelligence, and information, which should subdue the enemy rather than confront it. Overall, a good introductory book for anyone studying information warfare.

- Zeldon, Theodore (2000). *Conversation: How Talk Can Change Our Lives*. New Jersey, USA: HiddenSpring.

Even though this is a very short book with pictures, it provides interesting insight into the psychology of human conversation, how and why humans converse the way they do and how limited it is. The book discusses the shortcomings of our conversations in day to day life and its impacts on our sensitivity to other people's cultures and views. In relation to the paper, conversation in psyops is everything – perception is reality to most of us. This book discusses how we can go beyond our boring conversations to make it more interesting. It is a useful guidance in terms of learning to cope with and not to turn away from people with different perceptions and beliefs as more of this type of sensitivity will be required as the world shrinks.

- Abel, Reuben (1976). *Man is the Measure*. New York, New York, USA: The Free Press – A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.

At its core, this book is about epistemology. Specifically it discusses what scares people about philosophy, the differences between philosophy and other intellectual inquiries, and elements of critical analysis and speculation found in the philosophical realm. In these discussions, Abel provides a discussion of our perceptual knowledge obtained from our senses and how limited and deceptive it may be. Additionally he probes how our perceptions influence our beliefs until we attain certainty. The book discusses language and the significance of signs and symbols – a technique used a lot in Indonesian culture. In relation to the paper, this book is not extremely relevant and simply pontificates on philosophical subject matters that are not useful for the paper.

ENDNOTES

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