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Assessing the
Domestic Terrorism Risk
Kevin Chamberlain
The terror attacks against American targets
on September 11,
2001 greatly altered the perception of both the terrorist threat and America’s
vulnerability to attacks by foreign terror groups. Since then, billions
of
dollars have been spent at the federal, local, and state level to
reduce
vulnerabilities and increase response capacity. In addition, the
invasion of Afghanistan
in
the fall of 2001 and continued operations around the Afghan-Pakistan
border aim
to eliminate the operational capacity of Al Qaeda and other extremist
groups. Additional
attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda operatives against public
transportation targets
in London and Madrid in 2004 and 2005, respectively, reiterated the
need for a
unified effort on diplomatic, military, and law enforcement fronts to
counter
the threat posed by Islamist extremist organizations. Unified,
multifaceted efforts against groups
with formal command structures, considerable logistical and planning
operations, and traceable funding sources having been effective at
reducing their
operational capability to launch sophisticated attacks within the
United Stated.
The effectiveness of military and intelligence efforts at decapitating
key Al
Qaeda leadership and eliminating funding sources has greatly altered
the way these
targeted terrorist organizations operate. The primary terrorist threat
currently faced by America
is that from individuals or small cells operating independently of any
formal
terror network, but who identify with the ideology and tactics of
extremist
groups like Al Qaeda. The effective propaganda message spread by Al
Qaeda and
other extremist groups online, and the availability of literature and
resources
that not only distribute their message but provide information in
perpetrating
attacks also hamper efforts to prevent the spread of Islamist terrorism. The types of risks posed by these loosely
affiliated terror cells, in comparison to more formally structured
organizations,
differs also. Because of their lack of
funding and planning resources, attacks are more likely to be on a
smaller
scale and more conventional in nature. For example, the subway and
train
attacks carried out in England
and Spain
did not require considerable resources or money, compared to the amount
of
resources to perpetrate a larger scale WMD attack. A similar
conventional
attack would not be difficult to perpetrate in the United States, given the vulnerability
of mass transit systems
in major urban areas such as New York City
or Washington, D.C.
Sophisticated equipment to monitor the release of chemicals or
radiation, and
even increased passive surveillance, are not effective against
relatively
simple, conventional explosives detonated manually. Much of the efforts
to date
in the area of terror prevention are based on the assumption that an
attack
will originate overseas and require the infiltration of terrorist
operatives
into the United
States.
Other efforts have aimed to harden high profile targets such as federal
buildings, national monuments, and high risk facilities (nuclear
plants, chemical
plants, etc.). Perhaps the biggest threat currently faced by the United States would be a small terror
cell
composed of American citizens who already reside in the United States.
Because
of their organizational nature, infiltrating small groups and
preventing
potential attacks is difficult. The task of identifying potential
terrorists of
this type would fall primarily to local and state level law enforcement
agencies. Even then, the funding and evidence trail would be short and
difficult to establish. The United States continues to
face a threat from
radical Islamist terrorism. Because of successes in dismantling
organized
terror networks overseas, the primary domestic threat in the near term
consists
of conventional attacks against soft targets perpetrated by individuals
or
small cells with no formal connection to the groups whose ideologies
inspire
them.
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