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January 2003                                                 Volume 3 - Number 4

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Organization and Statutory Authority...

Clinton and Bush Administration’s Homeland Defense Policies and Emergency Management
by Jeff Miller

     In the wake of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, there has been a perceived movement within the United States to subordinate Emergency Management to Homeland Defense.  The culmination of this movement will be the placement of the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the Emergency Preparedness and Response Division of the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS).   A review of presidential initiatives and legislation over the past ten years reveals that Emergency Management has been increasingly tied to Homeland Defense and that efforts since September 11th are evolutionary and not revolutionary in nature.  Rather than countering efforts of the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration is building upon them, increasing their efficiency and impact.
   
     The Clinton administration’s homeland defense efforts were largely rhetoric until bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995 demonstrated that serious attacks within the US were in fact a reality.  In response to the Oklahoma City bombing, in 1995 the administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the US Policy on Counter-Terrorism.  This directive outlined a national counter-terrorism strategy that included emergency management as a key element.  PDD-39 also defined key agencies’ roles in each element of the strategy, including emergency management.  This directive formally made the Department of Justice the Lead Federal Agency for counter-terrorism and placed the National Security Council in charge of inter-agency coordination and implementation of a counter-terrorism strategy (see Homeland Defense: Threats and Policies in Transition).
 As a result of PDD-39 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) prepared the Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan.  This Annex delineates a Concept of Operations and specific agency responsibilities when responding to a domestic terrorism incident.  The Annex places the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in a crisis management role, as the lead federal agency following a terrorist incident.  If a federal consequence management response to the incident is required, FEMA will lead a concurrent response effort.  The FEMA effort is in support of the FBI effort until the Attorney General transfers the Lead Agency role to FEMA (see the Federal Response Plan, Terrorist Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan). 

     In 1996 the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, also known as the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, was passed as part of the Defense Authorization Act (Public Law [PL] 104-201).  Nunn-Lugar-Domenici served to strengthen federal, state and local responder’s abilities to react to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incidents.  The Act provided one billion dollars for these efforts and directed the Department of Defense to train 120 U.S. cities to respond to a chemical, biological or nuclear attack.  Also in 1996 Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act (PL104-132) giving the federal government various powers to use in the fight against terrorism.  Criticism of this bill largely focused on it not allowing the Department of Defense enough leeway in working with local agencies in the aftermath of WMD attacks (see Homeland Defense: Mobilizing Against Terrorism). 

     In another 1996 action, Congress formally approved the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an agreement among member states to assist one another responding to and recovering from disasters.  Although enacted in the wake of Hurricane Andrew and not intended solely as a homeland defense function, this compact grew out of the 1950 Federal Civil Defense Compact which granted states the authority to form compacts for civil defense purposes (see Emergency Management Assistance Compact: An Overview).
   
     The capstone Clinton Administration Homeland Defense measure was PDD-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas.  This directive solidified agencies’ roles in counter-terrorism and created an Office for the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism.  The directive deals extensively with consequence management and agency roles following a terrorist incident.  PDD-62 encouraged military participation in Emergency Management functions through the creation of National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams and the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) (see Presidential Decision Directive 62, unclassified abstract). 
    
     The above overview of select Presidential Decision Directives and legislation enacted during the Clinton Administration show a progression in the Homeland Defense and Emergency Management arenas.  The administration recognized terrorism as a domestic security threat and assigned the Department of Justice, via the FBI, as the lead agency.  Funding for counter-terrorist and consequence management programs increased dramatically, reaching $6.5 billion in FY 98 and $11.1 billion in FY 01.  Numerous programs directed federal agencies to cooperate with and assist state and local emergency management agencies.  Domestic-use specific military units were created to assist in WMD response.   Emergency Management and Homeland Defense were clearly becoming increasingly inter-related and receiving increased attention.
Despite efforts to increase Homeland Defense and Emergency Management capabilities, criticism of the Clinton Administrations’ efforts abound.  In 2000 Senator Pat Roberts described federal terrorism planning as a “confused, disjointed mess”.  Forty-six agencies and seven congressional committees have a role in terrorism or emergency response and there is much overlap with little understanding of each other’s roles and capabilities.  FEMA, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice and other federal agencies offer over 90 different courses in response functions teaching similar content (see Hearing on H.R. 525 Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act 2001). 
   
     The major criticism of the Clinton Administrations’ terrorism defense policies is that no one was in overall charge of the effort.  Although PDD-62 created the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism, this office had little power over other federal agencies.  Some analysts suggest that the National Coordinator had less power than the “Drug Czar” (see Homeland Defense: Threats and Policies in Transition).  The Federal Response Plan published by FEMA has proven an effective model for interagency coordination and delineation of tasks but applies only during consequence management, not addressing interagency roles in training or preparing for disaster. 
   
     In the spring of 2001 as the Bush Administration was getting established, Congress was debating HR 525, The Preparedness Against Domestic Terror Act of 2001.  This act recognized a need for a single coordinator of terrorism response and emergency management that would have authority over all federal agencies.  The Act proposed creating the President’s Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness within the Executive Office of the President.  The President was designated as the chairman of the council with an Executive Chairman who would be both confirmed by the Senate and required to testify before Congress when requested.   This rule had not been signed into law when the events of September 11th occurred (see Hearing on H.R. 525 Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act 2001).
   
    On September 20th 2001, President Bush announced the Establishment of the Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President.  This office was formally established by Executive Order 13228 on 8 October, which also established a Homeland Security Council.  This office and council are similar to the council proposed in HR 525 except that they are not statutorily established and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Director of OHS (Executive Chairman) is neither Senate confirmed nor required to testify before Congress (see Office of Homeland Security).
   
    The Director of the Office of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, states that he is “responsible for coordinating domestic response efforts of all departments and agencies in the event of imminent terrorist threat and during and in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack within the United States”.  Although this sounds duplicative of the role of FEMA, Director Ridge admits that he has no “tactical or operational” authority.  He further explains that his office is to take an unbiased look at all government terrorism and response plans and recommend a comprehensive, national plan for homeland defense.  On December 1, 2001, he did just that when he unveiled his plan for the DHS (see Homeland Security: The Presidential Coordination Office).
   
    Separate from the initiative to create a DHS, over 20 bills were introduced to the 107th Congress proposing federal assistance to state and local responders to prepare for terrorist attacks or WMD releases.  The Administration proposal is the First Responder Initiative, which would provide $3.5 billion to state and local agencies for terrorism preparedness. 
   
    The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee proposed Senate 2664, The First Responder Terrorism Preparedness Act.  This proposal roughly parallels the administration request: both direct FEMA to administer the program, provide a formula for distributing funding, include a matching requirement for recipients and direct that 75% of all money distributed to states must be re-distributed to sub-state level agencies.  Analysis of both proposals indicates that although these initiatives focus on WMD events, they will serve to improve Emergency Management functions overall, benefiting all hazards response (see First Responder Initiative: Policy Issues and Options).
   
    The culmination of the Bush Administration’s Homeland Defense efforts is the creation of the DHS, signed into law on November 25, 2002.  The primary mission of this agency is to protect the American Homeland.  This mission encompasses Emergency Management and promises to provide a single agency to coordinate all terrorism, response and preparedness efforts.  The creation of this department appears to be founded on lessons learned from the efforts of the Clinton Administration.
   
    Efforts prior to the creation of the DHS demonstrate the need for strong coordination among programs related to counter-terrorism, consequence management and preparation.  PDD-39, Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, the Anti-Terrorism Act and PDD 62 all assigned responsibilities or provided resources for Homeland Defense or Emergency Management efforts.  Subsequent review reveals many redundancies and several gaps between the programs created by 46 federal agencies and the 50 states.  The DHS will address this directly, placing responsibility for all federal programs in one department, and providing a single federal point of contact to the states. 
   
     Concurrently with this, by creating a single department there will be one individual overall in charge of all Homeland Defense and Emergency Response efforts.  PDD-62 attempted to do this through creation of the National Coordinator, but this positioned lacked the authority to direct other agencies’ activities.  The Department of Homeland Defense will overcome this problem by placing all pertinent organizations together in one agency under one director.
   
     The proposed organization of the DHS includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency under a sub-directorate.  This has raised concern that Emergency Management efforts are being subsumed by Homeland Defense and will lose effectiveness and relevance.  A review of ten years worth of legislation and directives shows that this is not a new idea, but has been a gradual progression since PDD-39.  Continuing efforts to increase Homeland Defense and Emergency Management effectiveness have been continually offset by a lack of coordination and clear delegation of responsibility.  A natural outcome is an effort to create a single responsible agency to streamline the process, creating greater efficiency, and hopefully, effectiveness.
   
     For the future, it seems that a reasonable course is to allow Emergency Management to become a function of Homeland Defense.  There are several benefits to doing so.  First, there will only be one response system for any disaster, whether natural, man-made (accidental) or the result of terrorism.  This should reduce response time and make training and planning easier for responders.  Including Emergency Management in Homeland Defense will also eliminate the need to resource two different sets of responders along with the associated equipment, facilities, procedures, etc….  Finally, natural and “accidental” disasters will allow responders an opportunity to exercise and train in trying situations in order to prepare for actual terrorist events.
   
     Reasons for separating Emergency Management from Homeland Defense include a fear that the public will lose the level of service that they currently receive if FEMA is reduced to a third-level organization, and a concern that “non-WMD” responders will be at risk if they are called to respond to terrorism caused events.  In the first case, it seems unlikely that either the public or politicians will abide a reduction in FEMA’s services, and that the DHS will be demanded to continue to provide the accustomed support.  Rarely will politicians accept less from the federal government than has been given before; the first disaster in which the response is questionable will likely see governor’s going to the president in an end-run around the DHS.
   
     As for the safety of responders, it seems that the safest course is to train all to be able to respond to the highest threat disasters: chemical, biological or nuclear events.  In the immediate response to a disaster it may be unclear what the cause was or whether WMD agents are present.  It is also unlikely that any first responder will wait for a special “Homeland Defense Response Unit” in the aftermath of a crisis.  The newly created Department of Homeland Security appears to be a reasonable method to address current shortcomings in capability while incorporating lessons from past efforts.  It holds the potential to reduces costs, streamline government and create a more effective system of Homeland Defense and Emergency Management than we have now.  Whether or not this will happen remains to be seen.
   
Bibliography


Canada, Ben.  First Responder Initiative: Policy Issues and Options.  Congressional Research Service report RL31475.  October 7, 2002.

Canada, Ben.  Emergency Management Assistance Compact: An Overview.  Congressional Research Service report RS21227.  August 23, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62. [Online] Available: http://www.info-sec.com/ciao/6factsheet.html. May 22, 2000.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency. Terrorist Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan.  [Online] Available: http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/frpterr.shtm. November 26, 2002.

Hicks and Associates, Inc.  Homeland Defense: Threats and Policies in Transition.  [Online] Available http://www.terrorism.com/homelan/CT&CIAfinal.html.  May 22, 2000.

McCutcheon, Chuck.  Congressional Quarterly Weekly. “Homeland Defense: Mobilizing Against Terrorism.” March 6, 1999.

Relyea, Harold.  “Office of Homeland Security”, Terrorism Briefing Book.  Congressional Research Service. August 7, 2002.

Relyea, Harold.  Homeland Security: The Presidential Coordination Office. Congressional Research Service report RL31148. August 7, 2002.

The Subcommittee on Economics, Public Buildings and Emergency Management.  Hearing on H.R. 425, Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2001. [Online] Available: http://www.house.gov/transportation/pbed/05-09-01/05-09-01memo.html.  November 26, 2002.

 
Useful Websites


http://www.usdoj.gov                    Department of Justice

http://www.fema.gov    The Federal Emergency Management Agency

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm    “Fourth Generation Warfare”

http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/        Department of Homeland Security

http://www.terrorism.com                Terrorism Research Center

http://www.infowar.com                Weapons of Mass Destruction

http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/force_protection/        DoD Antiterrorism Site

http://call.army.mil/call.htm    Center for Army Lessons Learned Research Library

http://www.nsi.org/                    National Security Institute

http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/    The National Guard and Homeland Defense

http://www.house.gov/shays/CRS/CRSProducts.htmList of Congressional Research Service Reports

http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/terrorism.htm        FBI Terrorism Homepage

http://www.nemaweb.org/index.cfm            National Emergency Managers