About a month ago my wife called from work to say her office may be closing for the day.  The reproductive legislative-rights group her organization shares floor space with had received an overnight letter containing white powder and a threatening note from the ‘Army of God’.  The police had already come and gone, leaving the now bleach-soaked and un-testable package behind.  The building had been evacuated briefly, but then reoccupied.  The FBI would be there any hour now to investigate.  My only thought was, ‘why aren’t you calling me from the pay phone outside the building – get out of there!’

Clayton Lee Wagner, now in police custody, had single-handedly, and without a penny spent on research and development, caused panic, disrupted business, and tied up emergency and federal resources at over 500 locations throughout the Eastern US.   We know there are countless other ideological, religious, militia, and anarchist groups or individuals whose targets lie in the smallest corners of hometown America.  In this new age of fear, the hoax can be as effective a weapon as an actual attack.  Possible severe psychological impact coupled with low risk of jail time may prove this a new weapon of choice among terrorists.

Consider the fact that the October anthrax attacks on the US, while causing only five actual deaths, made almost every American citizen scared of their mail.  Cipro was stockpiled, and countless patients presented themselves to local hospitals exhibiting ‘symptoms of exposure.’  It is not practical nor easy to copy-cat a skyjacking, but the benefit to a terrorist of sending one cent worth of flour in a five-cent envelope with a thirty-four cent stamp – a total of forty cents - is thousands of dollars worth of response, testing, lost business, and possibly the lost confidence in local authority to protect.

These hoaxes not only instill fear, but also expose any weaknesses in local first response and severely drain cash resources.  In Los Angeles, four 1998 hoaxes cost the city $2 million, resulting from the range of equipment and personnel required in response to threats of mass destruction.  So expensive have hoaxes been in Florida this year, that Governor Jeb Bush requested a federal emergency be called in his state to pay for the excessive cost of investigations.

The 1997 B’nai B’rith anthrax hoax in Washington, DC, is a good example of what emergency managers can expect to happen without sufficient staff training.  This event, the hoax of an anti-semetic, led to workers barricaded in their offices for over eight hours, the disruption of traffic in the surrounding area for as much time, and the humiliating scene of employees stripped to their underwear and hosed with chemicals on the sidewalk.  It was not a confidence-building moment.  A 1998 anthrax hoax in Riverside, CA, led to the disruption of a large section of the city when traffic was stopped for hours, UCLA students had trouble getting to their final exams, and many businesses suffered heavy losses during the vital Christmas shopping season.  One concerned bystander who questioned an officer about his level of risk was told, “if you’ve been exposed, you’re exposing everybody else, so keep yourself isolated!  You may want to go to the hospital and get yourself checked.”

While the 9/11 events were conducted primarily to cause as much destruction as possible, most terrorist attacks are carried out to maximize fear.  The effects of a hoax last only as long as fear and confusion can be sustained, and that amount of time correlates with the amount of time in which information can neither be obtained nor distributed.  Even poorly planned or unintentional hoaxes can produce confusion and terror, like one that occurred in March of 2001. An environmentalist group’s attempt to make a point to ‘polluters’ by sending them gray powder representing ‘pollution’ was mistaken for an anthrax attack, leading to building evacuations and the decontamination of 20 employees.

Unlike bomb threats, the direct psychological effects of chem/bio-hoaxes can last for days without sufficient and accurate public information exchange.  Victims often exhibit the psychosomatic symptoms of diseases they have been informed of only by media sensationalism.  Belief that incubation-periods can extend for two or three months increases these effects, and with the onset of flu-season the situation is complicated further.  Very often, a scared, angry public is left wondering why, in their time of need, the officials they elected seem powerless to help.

So, what can be done? 

First, hoaxes should not be an agency’s first experience with chem/bio-terror.  These events require a much different response than bomb-threats, and only training, exercise and technology can provide the necessary knowledge and awareness.  Local response must have the capability to quickly and accurately determine the legitimacy of threats in order to dispel panic.  All hoaxes must be treated as actual events until proven otherwise, thus demanding the coordinated response of police, fire, and public health officials.  The Office of National Domestic Preparedness (ONDP) publishes the Compendium of Training Courses offered to local and state response agencies by various federal agencies.  These must be taken advantage of.  Federal grants and/or mutual agreements between neighboring towns or counties can provide the capital resources necessary to purchase detection equipment.  Assets as simple as the widely available bio/chem test strips, designed to detect agents such as anthrax, plague and smallpox, can quickly avert an unnecessary disaster by ruling out threat.

Second, the Incident Command System (ICS) needs to be utilized in handling hoax events.  Without properly defined command structures in the highly stressful, emotional, and confusing scenario of a chem/bio-scare, conflicting orders often lead to a rapid breakdown in procedure.  Hoaxes require a response by many local agencies, and often various federal agencies including the FBI and EPA, thus the pre-establishment of interpersonal relationships is recommended.  The ONDP Compendium provides several classes on proper ICS development.  To round out the centralized command structure, efficient and compatible inter-agency communication systems must be developed to facilitate cooperation. 

Third, public communication protocols and a local media partnership should be established prior to the onset of an event.  A spokesperson, whose job is to facilitate constant contact with the public, should be designated.  In more serious hoaxes, it may be necessary to have a chief executive and key staff available to the media in order to inform and reassure the public with a clear, consistent message.  These emergency management/media relationships should be established well before an event arises so that mutual trust is ensured.  Also, with simple awareness campaigns, the public can be educated to recognize the difference between an obvious hoax and a potential threat.  Emergency management has a unique opportunity right now in that they have peoples’ attention – this chance should not be forsaken. 

Fourth, laws must be enacted to adequately convict those who wish to terrorize with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Local jurisdictions can develop or enhance their capability to prosecute crimes involving the planning of terrorism hoax events.  Some states have enacted the ability to fine those convicted of hoaxes for the cost of response, and others have empowered the judicial system with the ability to impose longer jail sentences.  The British government recently passed legislation allowing for 7 years imprisonment in hoaxes related to weapons of mass destruction.  Once again, we have a unique opportunity that should be taken advantage of.

Lastly, hoaxes should be seen as opportunities for surprise exercise.  The response community needs to expect that terrorism in all forms will aim to catch victims off guard, and the more they practice under these conditions, the better.  Standard procedure can be developed that allows for agencies to continue with an event, once it has been determined that there exists no real threat, as if they were conducting an interagency exercise.  This will allow for full analyses of readiness, and further develop the working relationships required to respond to future hoaxes and actual events with increased efficiency.  All hoaxes should have after-action reports conducted to define areas for improvement.

Recently, a jilted boyfriend phoned an airline to report that a passenger (his ex-girlfriend) on a specific flight was infected with smallpox.  The airplane was forced to the ground, with 170 passengers told to remain on board.  The Seattle response community quickly and effectively mobilized.  Remarkably, panic was contained and the plane was released to continue its flight just 2 and ½ hours later.  Why?  According to Washington State Chief Health Officer Dr. Maxine Hayes, “Their preparedness paid off.  Certainly our emergency-response system worked.” 

The author is a graduate student at the George Washington University School of Engineering and Applied Science.  He is currently working with the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management (http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~icdm), under institute director Dr. Jack Harrald, on an NSF quick-response grant to determine the interagency response to the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. The author may be contacted at dcoppola@gwu.edu