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October 2004                                                                            Volume 7 - Number 1

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Perspectives...

Bioterrorism: Can Officials Manage a Biological Attack?
by Pete Muldoon

The word “bioterrorism” can strike a deep chord of fear in the hearts of many Americans. In 2001, bioterroristic threats became more than a fleeting thought in the minds of many risk managers throughout the nation, including myself. At the time of the attacks, I was a member of the Office of Risk Management at The George Washington University, and assisted as an emergency responder for the campus. In 2001, the university joined the nation in a heightened sense of alert with reported cases of anthrax exposure due to bioterrorism at various locations throughout the country including Florida, New York, New Jersey and Washington, D.C. Speculations surfaced regarding a link between these events and the attacks of September 11, 2001.

After incidents of anthrax exposure at federal buildings in D.C., my office began responding to reports of suspicious white powder and letters, as well as to powdered donuts, sugar, drywall debris, and crushed medicine. At the height of the attacks, my office was receiving several reports each day of suspicious material. It was crucial to assume that all instances were suspect until an investigation could determine otherwise.

To begin the response, my office conducted risk assessments through the collection of incident information, interviews and updates. To further assess the threat, we donned appropriate personal protective equipment and entered the suspect contaminated areas. Suspect material was then sampled and the areas were decontaminated. In most instances the threat of anthrax exposure could be eliminated. In others, elimination proved more difficult, and the DC HAZMAT Team and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were called upon to respond. These organizations, as well private consultants and laboratories were overextended by pure volume, and response time increased significantly during the weeks preceding the first local incident. In some cases, the turn around time for sample analysis reached two to three weeks.

The university community continued to report concerns and suspicious materials, and campus officials gathered information on each biological agent and the appropriate response. It soon became apparent that a guideline for threat analysis was critical in deciphering the obvious non-anthrax threats and the possible suspect threats. Additionally, the university ordered all campus mailrooms tested for contamination, considering the anthrax attack used the U.S Postal Service to disseminate the biological agent. All suspect material and locations tested were found to contain no anthrax.

Tragically, several people lost their lives during this attack and many more were adversely affected by the negative side effects of the antibiotic Cipro used to treat possible exposure and the mental anguish associated with the attacks.

Fortunately, GWU may have some of the resources and expertise needed to respond in the event of a biological attack. For the general public, this is not an option. Had the anthrax attacks been more widespread, local and federal agencies would still be performing at maximum capacity and would potentially be unable to effectively respond to the overwhelming reports. With the natural human tendency to panic when coping with the unknown, the amount of unsubstantiated reports would be paralyzing to the responding agencies. While increased implementation of incidence response plans has left the country better prepared, a large-scale biological attack would still have the capability to cripple the nation’s first response agencies. A proactive approach would incorporate increasing public awareness on biological agents and to provide evaluation criteria for the public to be used in the event that a suspect material is discovered. This approach would reduce the number of unsubstantiated reports and allow the response agencies to focus on the legitimate biological threats.