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Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management Newsletter Website |
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October
2004
Volume 7
- Number 1 |
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Related Sites:
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9/11 Commission Recommendations for First Responders By Sumner Bossler On any normal day, American
Airlines
Flight 77 being hijacked and used in a suicide attack on the Pentagon
would
have been considered a monumental tragedy for our nation. However, it
was
eclipsed by the unfolding events occurring in New York City at the
World Trade
Center (WTC) at nearly the same moment. While
the three suicide attacks occurred nearly
simultaneously, the
emergency response required at each site was very different in scope.
These
differences aside, the response efforts at the WTC and the Pentagon
provide
hard earned insight into incident command and communications. The values of an integrated
multi-agency
multi-jurisdictional response are clear when considering the response
at the
pentagon. This emergency response combined a mix of local, state and
federal
agencies. Fortunately, the Incident
Command System (ICS) used in the Washington D.C. Metro area on
September 11th,
allowed first responders at the Pentagon to quickly overcome many
obstacles
across multiple jurisdictions. When comparing the responses, we must
remember
that events at the Pentagon were not hampered by the logistical and
communication barriers noted at the WTC. The hard learned lessons from
the attacks
on the WTC showed that even the most robust emergency response
capabilities
could be easily overwhelmed. Essential elements for a successful
response are
teamwork, collaboration and interagency cooperation. For a unified
incident
management system to succeed, each agency must have command and control
with
sufficient internal communications. While the teamwork, collaboration
and
inter-agency cooperation were present at the WTC site; command, control
and
internal communications were overwhelmed. The Fire Department of New
York (FDNY)
was besieged with the magnitude of the WTC attacks, and was generally
incapable
of coordinating the numbers of units responding within the 16-acre
complex. The
task of maintaining coordination and accountability was made nearly
impossible,
by internal communications breakdowns resulting from the limited
capabilities
of radios in the high-rise environment of the WTC as well as the
limited radio
frequencies. The lack of adequate communications was a critical element
at the
WTC and Pentagon sites, where multiple agencies over multiple
jurisdictions
were responding. It was less of an obstacle for the responders at the
Pentagon,
while at the WTC it proved fatal. The events at these very
different sites
provide strong evidence that compatible incident command with
sufficient
communications between local, state, and federal agencies remains a key
weakness in emergency response and management. These well-documented
structural
weaknesses within the emergency management system have resulted in the
9/11
Commission making the following recommendations for first responders
regarding
incident command and communications. 1.
“Emergency
Response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System
(ICS).
When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they
should
adopt a unified command. Both are proven frameworks for emergency
response. We
strongly support the decision that federal homeland security funding
will be
contingent, as of October 1, 2004, upon the adoption and regular use of
ICS and
unified command procedures. In the future, the Department of Homeland
security
should consider making contingent on aggressive and realistic training
in
accordance with ICS and unified command procedures.” 2.
“Congress
should support pending legislation, which provides for the expedited
and increased
assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. Furthermore,
high-risk
urban areas such as New York City and Washington, D.C. should establish
signal
corps units to ensure communications connectivity between and among
civilian
authorities, local first responders, and the National Guard. Federal
funding of
such units should be given big priority by Congress.” References The 9/11
Investigations.,
ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs,
New York. ISBN 1-58648-279-3 The 911/
Report: The National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. With reporting and
analysis by the
New York Times.,
Thomas
H. Kean, Chair and Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chair. (August 2004) St.
Martin’s
Press., New York. ISBN 0-312-93554-4 |