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Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management Newsletter Website |
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March
2007
Volume
12 - Number 3 |
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Threat Assessment Versus Risk Assessment By Jay Kubokawa For the purpose of this analysis, threat is distinguished from risk by the presence of intent. In a world of limited resources, do you choose to reduce a threat or reduce a risk? Threat Assessment Offense Requires knowledge of the enemy (weapons/capabilities) Targets of opportunity (exploit Logan to attack NYC) What weapons are available? Deterrence plans are not public Intelligence driven Threats are fluid and asymmetric Actions: intercept prior to incident Intent is to destroy Risk Assessment Defense Based on knowledge of self (vulnerabilities) Targets of value (defend critical infrastructure) What assets are vulnerable? Mitigation plans involve public input Policy/perception driven Assets are static, non-moving Actions: react after incident Intent is irrelevant Wich strategy serves the greater public good? In a threat situation, resources to counter the threat must have the autonomy to act independently, without the benefit of decisions made by committees or consensus. There is no time for debate. Often intelligence of threats has an extremely short shelf life. The threat will become action without actions to deter the threat. The opportunity to capture or kill the individual or individuals involved in the plot may be lost and the plans may realign to an easier target, a different location or a different venue unless immediate action is taken. Threat detection is costly, time consuming and requires human intelligence which cannot be derived from satellite photos. Intelligence is gathered from multiple sources, credible and not. Finding the needle in the haystack that specifically points to Logan Airport on September 11th is near impossible. As a result every lead has to be vetted for its veracity and actionable information. Threat deterrence is also a dispersed solution covering many possible targets, meaning there is a common good that is served for the community as a whole. Because it is a common good and not a concentrated focus with a vocal constituency, the benefits of deterrence are often underestimated and difficult to prove. Successes are overlooked and failures are seen as failures of the complete deterrence process. In a risk situation, the risks are well known and often geographically based. Flood plain, hurricane alley, high value targets, we’ve cataloged the risks based upon our experience. Actions to mitigate or prepare for these risks are the pawns of the political process and are skewed to our general self interest. All politics is local and who gets what in homeland security grants is local too. What is at risk and what should be spent to protect it? Politics plays a major role in risk identification and prioritization of what infrastructure is deemed critical by determining the criteria for awarding grants. The February 16th Government Executive Daily Briefing article titled, “Senate Fight Looms Over Revising Security Grant Formula”, makes it perfectly clear that there are significant grant dollars awarded based upon the state homeland security grant program. It’s not a matter of what is best for our nation, but rather, what is best for my constituency back home. These benefits are tangible, we don’t want to catch the bad guys, we want to harden every target in our state, maintain the status quo and create jobs and pork for the folks back home. In the article mentioned above, lawmakers from states that have large urban areas are uniting against those from small or more rural states to control the grant making process. With uncertain rewards for deterrence and tangible local benefits for mitigation, attention and funding are skewed to risk identification and risk management. We have become a culture so focused on the here and now that tomorrow, be it deficits or WMD are not matters for our concern. |