|
|
Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management Newsletter Website |
|
| |
March
2006
Volume
10 - Number 2 |
|
By Patrick Lynch
As a firefighter I see all too often the failure of
people to plan or mitigate risk in their daily lives. It can as simple
as not wearing your seatbelt or simply not knowing critical medical information
if a loved one becomes ill or injured. Nobody plans to get in an accident
or have their home catch fire. But when these events happen they can be catastrophic
for those involved. The best way to lesson the impact of these tragic
events is to be prepared for them at all times.
Just as individuals must mitigate risk in their lives, communities must also plan and prepare for significant events that could drastically impact the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. It is the community’s responsibility to identify and prioritize the potential hazards which could have the most drastic outcomes. Like individuals who take necessary precautions to prepare for disasters, communities must also prepare for and develop procedures for mitigating the risk and minimizing the effects of potential hazards. Throughout this process, of preparedness, mitigation, and planning, the federal government’s role should be a more supportive role than a directive one. I was fortunate enough to be part of a Northern Virginia task force (NOVA TF) that was sent to Hancock County, Mississippi to provide fire and EMS services in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The group was comprised of approximately fifty firefighters and EMS personnel ranging from senior ranking officials to basic firefighters. A total of six task forces, from Northern Virginia, went down to Mississippi to contribute to relief efforts. The focus of the deployment was to provide emergency services to the residents of Hancock County. The overall success of the deployment effort was outstanding. The task force was able to meet the fire and EMS needs of the residents as well as meet their varied humanitarian needs. The needs/ goals of the task force were identified and communicated to the personnel through out the deployment. The deployed firefighters were able to perform their tasks with little interference from outside agencies. A key factor that made the different departments so effective was that the departments, as a result of all being from the same geographic area, were also part of the Northern Virginia Council of Governments (COG). The COG had already been working to integrate their firefighting and rescue capabilities and routinely operate roughly within the same guidelines. The leadership and command structure operated the same as they always did, using the terms and leadership components laid out in the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System, eliminating the need to implement or develop a new command structure and type while in Mississippi. This ability to mesh the operating guidelines and leadership from the different departments enhanced the effectiveness and capability of the unit. There were no additional regulations or cumbersome bureaucracy that inhibited the performance of the group. The task force leaders were able to identify and adapt to new concerns or risks that came into effect as the days progressed. When wild land fires became a larger threat they were initially expected to, leaders on the ground were able to quickly direct assets to the areas deemed most vulnerable. It was this seamless command between the local leaders, task force leaders and the government representatives that made these deployments so successful. FEMA and other government agencies were on hand and often provided expertise (especially in the wild land fire threat) and funding for much of the rebuilding, clean up, and many other support functions, (as well as supporting fire fighter operations.) Yet, they allowed the local leadership and task force leadership to run the operations while determining and changing priorities throughout the process to meet established objectives. The government’s ability to provide logistical, organizational (in the form of NRP and NIMS), and financial support was a major key to the success of the operation. The federal government did not come in and take control of the situation, imposing their will and priorities; they came in and offered assistance, letting the local leadership direct the aid to the areas where it was needed most. This type of support role is the most effective way for the federal government to assist communi |