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Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management Newsletter Website |
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February
2004
Volume 6
- Number 1 |
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MICHAEL G. POSILLICO TERRORIST RISK-PERSONAL VIEW Risk as defined by Haddow and Bullock in Emergency Management is “susceptibility to death, injury, damage, destruction, disruption, stoppage …” with disaster identified as “an event that demands substantial crisis response requiring the use of government powers and resources beyond the scope of one line or service. The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 underscored the importance of effective emergency management and alerted all Americans to the most serious threat to the national interest since the nation’s inception. On a professional level, I have been an active participant in terrorism investigations since 1991. This career afforded me the opportunity to study early-on and firsthand this emerging risk, which was for the most part localized and did not directly impact the U.S. homeland, save for the first World Trade Center attack. In addition to having access to sensitive intelligence information, I’ve debriefed witnesses and hostages as well as sources and suspects from Aden to Zanzibar. In this capacity I’ve also witnessed firsthand the management of the threat by the policymakers and managers. Needless to say, this life experience dominates my personal perspective on the terrorist risk and its potential impact on our democratic values. The official U.S. Government definition of terrorism was adopted in 1972 following the murder of nine Israeli athletes by the Black September organization. Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (Patterns of Global Terrorism, Department of State 1997). Since that time and prior to the World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks, there were several hundred incidents and thousands of articles - some scholarly, some not so learned - on the threat terrorist groups presented to world order. Voices within the U.S law enforcement and intelligence communities raised the alarm, albeit unsuccessfully, cautioning that the U.S. was not immune from terrorist targeting. Regrettably, the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center was accepted as the work of indigenous terrorists despite substantive evidence to the contrary. Oplan Bojinka, the 1995 Yousuf plot to destroy eleven U.S. airliners over the Asian Pacific, assassinate President Clinton, the Pope and a host of dignitaries, as well as crash airliners into the Pentagon and CIA headquarters, was similarly ignored although indicative of Al Qaeda’s global intentions. (Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda).
In 1996, the FBI and the CIA convinced of the growing threat from the Al Qaeda organization and the international ramifications created a jointly operated unit - designated Alex station - to focus on the infrastructure, capabilities and funding of the group, and in particular Osama Bin Ladin. (Murray Weiss, The Man Who Knew Too Much). Additionally, the FBI and the CIA detailed senior representatives to their respective counter-terrorism units, and initiated an open exchange of information that was growing exponentially at the time of the attack, but incomplete. My personal opinion is that the critics were simplistic in their assertion that the events of 9/11 could have been prevented, and were the results of an intelligence breakdown. Viewed within the context of deterrence, coordinated and efficient mitigation was lacking. Repeated warnings with credible documentation to policymakers were ignored, and resources with sustained commitment to address the analytical challenge posed by the Al Qaeda were seriously lacking. Considering the Bin Ladin formal declaration of war against “Jews and the Crusaders” on February 23, 1998, followed by successful attacks against U.S. interests in Yemen, (the USS Cole), Kenya and Nairobi, this failure to act is particularly egregious. Although planning and training may reduce the opportunities for a successful attack, we must recognize and accept that there is no foolproof method, which would predict, or prevent a terrorist attack. With the threat of catastrophic terrorism to include chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons as well as cyber attacks on our infrastructure dominating all aspects of our lives, the government’s ability to effectively safeguard the nation is called into question on a daily basis. At the same time the government is taking extraordinary steps to maintain its responsibility employing measures that would have been vigorously opposed prior to the attacks. In this respect terrorism presents an indirect threat to our democratic way of life. Freedom of movement, long a characteristic of our society, has been challenged in the post 9/11 world and the Patriot Act presents restrictions in terms of privacy issues. Vice President Cheney summarized it best when in the immediate aftermath of the attacks he commented that our way of life prior to 9/11 might never return. It is too soon to evaluate this assertion, but the lethality of the continued credible threat precludes challenge to those policies implemented by the government to safeguard our vital interests.
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