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Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management Newsletter Website |
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February
2004
Volume 6
- Number 1 |
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Perception
of the Terrorism Risk By Sarah
Self-Kyler
The terrorism risk is
real. I believe most U.S. citizens and
our foreign allies agree that there will always be those who do not
share our
American ideals, values and practices, and will, therefore, feel a need
to
destroy them. Terrorism exists on many
planes – country-supported, religious-supported, militia soldiers,
foreign-born, domestic, etc. Because of
this multi-dimensional threat, extraordinary out-pourings of resources,
both
manpower and fiscal, are required to ensure the appropriate amount of
attention
is given to every hotline tip and ounce of evidence.
Critical in this step is realizing that all U.S. agencies,
coalition countries and Americans share the common goal of detecting
and mitigating
acts of terrorism; However, we do not yet have a network in place to
share
finding nor address the threats with a singular face.
I
strongly believe that communication will be the foundation of
mitigating our
terrorism risk. Slowly, we have created
an infrastructure thought to “hunt” and gather intelligence on
suspected
terrorist and terrorist activities and that will prepare Americans for
the next
threat. The information comes from many
sources, such as the DOD, CIA, FBI, and coalition forces.
It is these information ties that need to be
continually strengthened and made more efficient. The
immediate collaboration of information resources and
broadcasts brought together by the joint counter-terrorism intelligence
analysis office – the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) - may
be the
answer. However, I fear this agency may
not take into account unpredictable, discrete, small-scale acts that
may
produce a large-scale effect, such as bio warfare from a single
individual or
small group. The TTIC convenes analysts from Homeland Security, the FBI
and the
CIA in hopes of providing a streamlined, one-stop shopping for
terrorism
intelligence. I believe the office may
suffer from parochialism, selective distribution, and a traditional eye
that
will not account for the next terrorist vehicle or agent.
Terrorism vulnerabilities now exist on a
less predictable front or one we are not structured to uncover. Americans now focus their fears and
preparation on an airplane threat or truck bombing at a high interest
site, but
this may be the least likely front of attack. The government is doing a
fine job of making Americans feel secure for the more predictable
threats,
meaning the efforts to reinforce and secure government buildings are
nearly in
place and precautions are taken to inspect and research passengers
aboard
airplanes prior to take-off. Because of
this, most Americans have moved on with their everyday pattern of life
without
feeling threatened. The use of
terrorism risk color-coding has helped keep the country informed and
alert,
keeping the danger ever-present in the routine of daily life. This is a necessary procedure to keep
reminding Americans of the threat in a world of ever-changing media
interest
items and to guard against complacency. It is for these reasons that
I believe high-visibility sites are no longer tenable targets for
future
terrorists. They are going to seek the
least protected, least intelligence-gathered method of attack. To counter the burgeoning terrorist threat,
we will need not just a federally mandated intelligence agency, but
also a
congruent network in every regional police agency and support service. The local authorities are the experts in
their region and field, and should be the first to suspect suspicious
activity. We can leverage their talent
through a
streamlined, unfiltered web of intelligence for which they cannot only
draw
data from, but have the ability to push data to higher authorities. The technology for this is available and
affordable given the federal subsidies appropriated to states for
public-safety
and anti-terrorism security. The
network will also be valuable in developing and sharing war-gaming
scenarios
and to share suggested responses, lessons learned and best practices. |