Ten years ago this month, President George Bush (the first) made a surprising decision to request UN authorization for a large-scale UN intervention into Somalia to mitigate a rapidly expanding humanitarian disaster.  This request, which also included the offer for the United States to lead the UN coalition, set the stage for a successful short-term humanitarian relief operation.  The short-term success of this intervention, however, was quickly overshadowed by the long-term inability of follow-on international and U.S. efforts to promote a stable domestic environment for sustained humanitarian recovery.  This paper provides a brief U.S.-centric overview of what went well in the early stages of Operation Restore Hope, why the use of military assets was appropriate for this short-term effort, and more importantly, why the overall use of the selected military assets in Somalia failed.

What Went Well
     In March 1991 (eighteen months before President Bush's request to the UN), the U.S. Department of State declared a state of disaster in Somalia and commenced relief operations with several non-governmental organizations.  This declaration was brought about by escalating crop failures (induced by drought and civil war) and the onset of famine with Somalia's youth being especially at risk (infant death rates as high as seventy percent in some locales).  Overall, approximately a quarter of the country's population (1.5 million people) was considered at risk and another 800,000 were displaced refugees.
As the U.S. military became involved in the Somalia relief operations, two key capabilities were crucial to the short-term success in delivering international food aid:

    1. The U.S. military had the unparalleled capability to transport large quantities of relief supplies and personnel via air to major airfields in Somalia as well as to outlying distribution centers.  The overwhelming military strength of the U.S. contingent also facilitated the securing of ground transportation routes and distribution sites.  

2. The declared emphasis on protecting the military members of the United Task Force (UNITAF) created a very clear message for the local clan members:  Do not interfere with the shipment and distribution of food and do not take a hostile stance towards the U.S. military contingent (many of whom were U.S. Marines).   

While these factors facilitated a short-term "solution" to the problem of human starvation, the underlying causes of the civil strife were not addressed.  In fact, the declaration of a short-term and narrow mission for the UNITAF forces made it relatively easy for the local clan leaders to temporarily bear the foreign military presence.  
 
Where We Failed
    Perhaps no term is of greater distaste to military planners than “nation-building.”  While it can be argued that the U.S. military is not trained or mandated to perform "nation-building," it must be recognized that unless sustainable legal, law enforcement and financial institutions are put in place, any preceding humanitarian assistance is just a Band-Aid.  When the UNITAF forces deployed to Somalia in December 1992, they brought with them forces to fulfill UN Resolution 794 (the draft of which was written by U.S. military planners in the Pentagon).  But since the focus of the Resolution was short-term humanitarian assistance (and not long-term societal enhancements), Army civil affairs specialists, who are trained in foreign civil sector improvement, and other specialists were under represented.  The result was a successful "in and out" military operation, but no consideration for what followed the "out."
As the United States poises itself for war with Iraq, a concerted effort is required to ensure that, after the last bomb falls, assets and plans are in place to do more than just deliver short-term humanitarian assistance.  Something must be in place after the inevitable "out."

References:
Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).

Robert B. Oakley, “An Envoy’s Perspective,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1993): 44-55.

The author is a former U.S. Marine and served in Somalia during Operation United Shield.