During testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 7 May 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld identified three scenarios in which he envisioned that the U.S. military may be "involved in activity within the United States."  These scenarios included: "extraordinary circumstances" which require the Department of Defense to perform domestic military missions (e.g. combat air patrols and maritime security operations after the 11 September 2001 attacks); "emergency circumstances" such as natural disasters that necessitate the use of military assets in support of responding agencies; and limited military operations in support of other lead agencies, to include national security special events such as the Olympics and  Presidential Inaugurations.  This paper focuses on the second of these scenarios ("emergency circumstances") and highlights the historical trends of military support to emergency management agencies within the United States and how said support often results from the leveraging of preparedness for "extraordinary circumstances" and "limited in scope" domestic missions.

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)
    Historically, the U.S. military has had a more visible domestic role in supporting law enforcement activities than in responding to natural disasters.  This mirrors a trend among most federal agencies which, prior to World War II, viewed emergency preparedness as a local issue and emergency response as an ad hoc and "as required" federal issue.  When military forces were authorized for domestic "emergencies," the precipitating event was often related to civil unrest and was viewed as a law enforcement-style mission.  During the colonial period, state militia forces were used on numerous occasions to put down uprisings related to taxation and property rights.  These events included Shay’s Rebellion in 1786 (over land foreclosures in Western Massachusetts) and the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania (over the imposition of a new whiskey tax).  In the early 1900's, labor disputes, such as the West Virginia coal miner strike in 1921 and the 1934 San Francisco Longshoremen strike, also resulted in the authorized use of U.S. military forces. [1]

     With the onset of the Cold War and the Civil Defense era (discussed below), the renamed Department of Defense began to focus on "extraordinary circumstances" related to nuclear war but continued to employ military forces (primarily the National Guard) for the domestic enforcement of Civil Rights legislation. From 1945 to 1967, twenty-eight states employed the National Guard on seventy-two occasions.[1]  Included in these events were the high profile showdown between President Kennedy and Governor Wallace over school integration in Alabama and the 1965 Watts Riot in Los Angeles. 
As the Cold War and the Soviet nuclear threat came to an end, military support to emergency management overcame the emphasis on civil defense and a more structured framework was developed to outline emergency preparedness roles and responsibilities among the various federal agencies.[2]  Despite this federal shift towards disaster preparedness and response, the Department of Defense again found itself involved in several high visibility law enforcement mission including the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of four police officers involved in the Rodney King beating incident and the 1993 stand-off at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas.  This long history of "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances" (MACDIS) underscores the fact that the U.S. military, as a federally organized and funded organization with the primary mission of combat supremacy, is often perceived as a ready and capable asset during periods of domestic strife.  But as incidents such as the 1970 Kent State shootings highlight, military operations and domestic stability operations require different training, equipment and mindsets.  Any planning for future use of U.S. military assets for assistance to civilian authorities, especially current references to quarantine operations during a bio-terrorism event, must give careful consideration to the limitations and dangers of such an action.  Using airborne and ship-based military forces during an "extraordinary circumstance" provides the luxury of a spatial-buffer that will not exist if U.S. ground forces are deployed to maintain social stability on a large scale. 

From Civil Defense to Emergency Management
      In 1948, Russell Hopley, the director of the new Office of Civil Defense Planning, submitted a report to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in which Hopley stated that a broad purpose of a post-World War II civil defense program would be to create “a peacetime organization which should be used in natural disasters even though it may never have to be used for war.”[3]  While the "Hopley Report" clearly identified the benefit and utility of developing an "all-hazards" approach to domestic emergency preparedness, the caveat that “basic operational responsibility be placed in States and communities," as well as the rising perception of a Soviet threat, divorced the federal government and the Department of Defense from direct responsibility for preparing the nation for natural disasters and centered their efforts (and funding) instead on civil defense.  Nonetheless, on paper, the Department of Defense was the lead federal organization for national emergency preparedness and planning for much of the Cold War. 

     From 1950 to 1972, a string of DoD agencies led national efforts related to "emergency preparedness": the Federal Civil Defense Administration (1950-1958); the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (1958-1961); the Office of Civil Defense (1961-1972); the Office of Emergency Planning (1961-1972); and the Office of Emergency Preparedness (1968-1973).[4]  While geared towards preparing U.S. citizens for World War III, these organizations still played an active role in managing natural disasters.  During the period of January 1953 to June 1964, OEP coordinated federal disaster assistance for 180 major disasters including 87 floods, 27 hurricanes, 23 severe storms and 18 tornadoes. 

    By 1978, however, there were three federal agencies sharing responsibility for the emergency preparedness of the nation and its citizens: the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) in the GSA; the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) in the Department of Defense; and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  While the FPA focused primarily on emergency preparedness and the FDAA coordinated federal disaster response efforts, the DCPA and DoD had primary responsibility for evacuation planning, communication systems, temporary shelter plans and continuity of government plans.[4]  Although these DoD responsibilities may appear to be a continuation of earlier civil defense planning performed by the OEP, a subtle hint hidden in the title of the DCPA - "Preparedness" vice "Defense" - underscores a significant change that occurred in 1972 with its creation.  In its first annual report to the Secretary of Defense (aptly titled "Civil Preparedness - A New Dual Mission"), the DCPA wrote that "Today, 'civil defense' really is preparedness to meet a full range of emergencies and disasters in peacetime as well as providing preparedness against the effects of a nuclear attack."[5] But while there was clear intent and commitment shown for promoting a "dual mission" framework, the separation of emergency preparedness roles and responsibilities among three federal agencies made a comprehensive strategy untenable.

     By the late 1980's, the need to clearly define federal roles and responsibilities was addressed in Executive Order 12656 which assigned to the DoD responsibilities related to water supply assurance and damage assessment as well as a variety of emergency planning coordination responsibilities.  A few years later, Department of Defense, via the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was assigned the lead federal agency responsibility for Public Works and Engineering under the Federal Response Plan.  This lead emergency support function (ESF) was a nature role for the USACE which had been authorized since 1941 to spend money for the repair and maintenance of flood control systems that are damaged or destroyed.  For the remainder of the Federal response Plan, to include the Terrorism Incident Annex, the DoD plays a supporting role to the assigned lead federal agency and the supported state and local agencies.
As alluded to earlier, this subordination of the DoD is a nature result of a century of outward focus and the deliberate establishment of civilian control over the military.  The result, however, has been the creation of an image within the emergency management community of the DoD as a reluctant federal organization unable to provide significant operational expertise during domestic disasters.  As one FEMA official wrote in a 2001 letter to the General Accounting Office: "FEMA tends to utilize DOD assets as 'a last resort' when other Agencies cannot provide the assistance needed, this is most evident in the use of transportation or the military ability to expeditiously mobilize assets."[6]

Current and Future Influences on the DoD Role
    Two issues that currently impact the role of the U.S. military in domestic emergency management, and which will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, are deliberate legislative obstacles to the enhancement of domestic military responsibility and the prevalence of "local" military leadership in state emergency management organizations.  As the military is suppose to reimbursed following the performance of domestic support missions (via the Economy Act - 31 U.S.C. 1535), its annual budget does not include line items for domestic emergency response programs.  While there are funding provisions for training programs such as the Nunn-Lugar program, the fielding of Civil Support Teams (CSTs) and national security special events such as the Olympics, the DoD must pay with its own resources to prepare its forces for potential emergency response functions.  As this requirement is low when compared to combat efficiency training, the incentive for the domestic preparedness training is low.
   
     Finally, a twist exists to the image of the U.S. military being a supporting agency to state and local officials.  In their capacity as state adjutant generals (and therefore under the authority of the governor), military officers in twenty-three states are in command of their respective emergency management offices.[7]  Usually falling under the structure of the state's military department or National Guard office, this fusion of military support and disaster response provides a truly operational framework for the development of an "all-hazards" approach to emergency management.  This framework, however, will require the infusion and control of federal funding if the current dichotomy that exists between federal funding and local response is to be bridged.

References
1. John J. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983).

2. Executive Order 12656 , 18 November 1988. "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities." Federal Register 53, no. 228 (23 November 1988).


3. Russell J. Hopley, Civil Defense for National Security, a Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning (1 October 1948).

4. Clark F. Norton, Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Assistance: Federal Organization and Programs.  (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 18 April 1978).

5. Civil Preparedness - A New Dual Mission.  Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Annual Report FY1972.   

6. Lacy E. Suiter, Executive Associate Director, Response and Recovery Directorate, letter to Henry L. Hinton, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. General Accounting Office (5 January 2001).  Cited in GAO Report GAO-01-9, January 2001.  

7. Maj. Gen. William A. Cugno, Adjutant General of Connecticut, Terrorism Prevention, Response, statement before the House Governmental Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs, and International Relations, United States House of Representatives. 107th Cong., 1st sess., 23 July 2001.