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NOTICE:
TIEMS Transportation Safety and Security Workshop January 28-29th 2003
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Welcome to
the
Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management
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| January 2003
Volume 3 - Number 4 |
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TURKEY: A CASE STUDY OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE MARMARA EARTHQUAKE
Presented by: Erdem Ergin
Turkey is a large country, with an area of 780’000
km2 and a population of 65 million people, which is prone to natural disaster
mainly due to its vast geography. It stands at the intersection of several
tectonic plates and has a very dynamic landscape, causing sudden events such
as earthquakes or long-term catastrophes such as erosion. Furthermore, this
geography enhances the existence of regional microclimates issuing region
specific risk characteristics.Turkey has had 122 earthquakes in the last century with more than 90.000 casualties. And many other natural hazards such as flood, landslides, mudslides, and droughts occur every year. Besides the heavy annual human loss incurred, there is an important negative effect to the economy as depicted from the estimated 23 billions USD cost of the ‘99 Kocaeli earthquake. Other than natural disasters, minorities cohabiting in Turkey, the geopolitical position, the unsettled democracy culture, fairly recent industrialization, the rich natural resources and general dynamics of the surrounding countries are or can be all reason for a crisis of some kind. Before going into detail about the statutory authority and organization of the Disaster and Crisis Management (DCM), I would like to mention the scope and aim of this paper. Turkey has always had very active politics, mainly due to the ‘recent’ establishment of the republic in 1923 and the new concept of democracy. By several times the army has made a coup to take power and ‘restore’ democracy and social rest they thought in danger. The constitution has been changed several times, the number of ministry changes often, and all the task delineation with it. Knowing that today, in 79 years of republic, the 58th government is ruling will give an idea of how fast rulers and ways of ruling can change in Turkey. So for keeping it simple but yet thorough, I will give a short historical overview to show how DCM has evolved; its situation before the earthquake; the changes that occurred after the earthquake; an analyze and comparison of the pre and post structure with thoughts for the future. Due to the huge number of laws, decrees and protocols in the field, I will try to summarize them by depicting the organizational scheme they lead to. My ultimate aim in writing this paper is two fold; first to analyze, understand and interpret the Turkish DCM model at a state level; and to provide the audience with a comprehensive case study of a developing country and its dynamics. 2- The pre 99 DCM structure and how it evolved The concept of DCM takes a long trip to take its current name and content, in fact its source can be traced back to the industrial revolution, with the need to protect industries from potential risks and preserve national economies. The first concept is then passive defense, based on the continuity of production during WW1. It becomes civil protection in the aftermath of WW2, coming out from tensions during Korean War and the beginning of the Cold War era; basically it extends the concept of protecting the populations to peace times. The last transition is twofold: civil defense and civil security. The first stands for war situations and the second for disasters. This final approach shows the will to adapt the concept to modern life and make it more extensive by introducing an all-hazard notion. hen we look at the regulations and laws, the first on the subject appears in 1928 and is about the civil defense performed by the army in times of air raids. Then, in 1938, the law 3502 announces the foundation of the Command of Aerial Defense, under military operations. The Cold War era and the adhesion of Turkey to the NATO make the institutionalization of civil security a must and in 1954 the law 7126 the foundation of the General Directorate of Civil Defense (GDCD) under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), and the state becomes at last involved in the issue. Despite its name, it addresses to war and disasters and is based on a very centralized and strict authority like in the military. Though, it has a controversial extension imposing the involvement of all governmental and non-governmental organizations. After the ‘39 Erzincan earthquake, which caused more than 40.000 casualties, the government enacts a law (4623, in 1944) to take preventive measures against earthquakes. For the first time risk evaluation, construction reliabilities and preparation of response activities and programs are addressed. Then, in 1956 and 1959 the government enacts two laws concerning the public works in natural disasters. The law 7269, ‘Organization of the aids to be provided in case of a disaster disturbing the social life’ is the essential law in the matter and is an adaptation from the French and Swiss codes. By so, the natural disaster management is given to the Ministry of Settlement, and not Ministry of Internal Affairs as in most European countries. The law attributes the Ministry of Settlement the role of taking preventive measures against, coordinating response after and recovery from natural disasters. It will be leading other ministries and institutions involved. It has the responsibility of assuring that response is provided to citizens and has the role of repairing and rebuilding damaged infrastructure and habitations. What is seen is that although the term is formulated at last, many ambiguities and flaws exist; the law gives a very extensive responsibility but lacks precision in task division. These issues will be discussed later on. A major change occurs after the third military coup occurs and the constitution is changed (1982). The article 119 defines a ‘state of exception’ and a ‘strict management’ to be decided and approved by the cabinet and congress if needed in case of natural disasters, socio-economic crisis or epidemics. Their activation at a regional or national level basically means the authorization for the government to issue laws and decree to respond to the situation; to make more strict controls and law enforcement; to mobilize every good and citizen when needed, without any permission or requirement; and to involve the army in the management as ‘support’ when needed. The law 2935 (in 1983) clarifies the responsibilities and roles of the government in such situation. The article is capital as it unifies disaster and crisis management, and opens a constitutional remedy to political crisis; the army can now be involved without making any coup. The decree-law 180 (enacted in 83 with changes in 84 and 86) announces the foundation of the Ministry of Public Work and Settlement (MPWS) and passes the role of the MS to it. A functional branch, the General Directorate of Natural Disaster Works (GDNDW) is established. In 1996, the decree 7750 obligates the state to reimburse the family of a disaster victim for casualty, disablement, and loss of habitation and/or business. The last major change occurs in 1997. The context is very important as the pro-Islamic party was in power, many strikes were occurring through the country, and problems with Russia and Cyprus were arising. Serious concerns arose and noting that the army needs the approbation of the congress for the ‘constitutional remedy’, the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (PMCMC) was founded, based not upon a law but the protocol 8716. The PMCMC basically comes on top on the existing organization and takes the responsibility of coordinating response to natural disasters, socio-economic crisis, large population displacement, weapons of mass destruction and epidemics. The PMCMC’s coordination committee is the supreme decision maker in times of crisis and is constituted by the prime minister, involved ministers, and the military chief of general staff. So the issue is that, in state of exception, the heavily military PMCMC bypass the consent of the congress and takes total control. The PMCMC is activated as a whole only when needed; otherwise the secretariat is operating permanently and is located in the National Security Council building (NSC, Council uniting the president, prime minister and military to discuss national issues). The decisions are taken together but the coordination and executive mission belongs to military officers. The budget is decided in the NSC and all staff is to be appointed by its secretary, also responsible for the permanent operation of the center. On the other side, the army has, by internal law 211/112, to act according to the law 7269, which does not depict any task for the military. So the army is now a second structure, a backup disseminated wherever the need is, without a concise pre-defined mission. The organization schemes of the pre and post structures are given in the appendices. At the provincial level, the governors are responsible of coping with the situation. They are in charge of operating the local crisis management and coordinating the local heads of the government’s organizations. They are themselves attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 3- The post-99 DCM structure The response of the state to the ‘99 Kocaeli earthquake was a complete failure and the need of reorganization has been imminent. The World Bank has launched the 505 million$ Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction loan (MEER) with a component of disaster response system. Moreover the state itself has gone through reorganization, founding new institutions and changing existing structure. Two actions have been taken temporarily; the decree-law 576 of 1999 announces the foundation of Regional Crisis Coordination Units, one in the five most affected provinces, for two years and supervised by the MIA. And the decree 210 establishing a Disaster Construction Coordination Unit in Kocaeli for two years, this unit reports to the MPWS. Permanent changes can be seen primarily with the MEER loan. This loan addresses several issues but the main component includes building an administrative center to coordinate all DCM efforts; initiating a disaster insurance pool; installing a land use planning and enforcement of construction codes; and starting a program of cadastre renovation and land management. With these objectives the decree-law 583 of 1999 and 600 of 2000 enact the establishment of the Prime Ministry Emergency Management Directorate (PMEMD). This institution is an operational branch of the Prime Ministry and its responsibilities are: first to ensure the establishment of emergency management centers at governmental agencies and departments, to determine their working principles and the coordination between them; second, to monitor and evaluate the taking of the necessary measures, the short and long term planning and the establishment of data banks to be used in disasters and the mitigation of their damage when they occur; third, to coordination in the utilization of all types of transport vehicles and rescue equipment and materials owned by public and private sectors when needed; forth, to encourage NGOs and individuals providing relief in emergency situations and to coordinate and distribute donations; and fifth, to carry out other duties assigned by the Prime Minister. It becomes then coordinator in the PMCMC but its scope is for natural and technological disasters only, it does not include riots, socio-economic crisis, epidemics, and others (where other ministries or military is coordinator). Another important change implemented with MEER is the decree-law 587 in 1999, making building disaster insurance obligatory through the nation and establishing the Natural Disaster Insurance Agency under the Ministry of State. The third important implication of MEER is the decree-law 595 of 2000; creating a new construction inspection system to prevent human and property losses, waste of resources, to improve urbanization and to protect the rights of victims and their compensation. To make the transition from the old system to the new, a transition committee made of the PMEMD, the Directorate of Civil Defense, the General Directorate of Natural Disaster Works, the State Planning Agency and the Project Implementation Unit has been established. The state also founds the National Earthquake Council, composed of 20 experts in different fields and its missions are: to evaluate scientifically the earthquake predictions and to inform the society at large; to make research of mitigation activities; to advise governmental decision makers; to evaluate the ethical concerns about earthquake predictions. The Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) had a particularly poor performance during the response and has been put under state control with the decree-law 576 of 1999. This decree-law states that TRC should reorganize and manage itself according to its internal regulation. From now on, the Ministry Council has the right over the TRC general council to approve/change its internal regulation, control its activities, and end/start its committees. The General Directorate of Civil Defense has also been reorganized due to its lack of effectives. The decree-laws 586 of 1999 and 596 of 2000 says that, the present 3 national centers of Search and Rescue (SAR) Teams are to be increased to 11 and 2470 positions have been opened; furthermore, the Civil Defense organization will now be present at a province and county level and able to train and form more SAR Teams than ever. Also, all public and private organizations have to have a fire evacuation plan with the necessary training and equipment. Also to improve the DCM, a partnership between FEMA and the MPWS has been started in 2000. Already in charge of natural disaster management, the project’s scope is ‘to increase the capability to mitigate against and respond to natural and non-natural technological disasters’. The most recent and important modifications are those made on the legislation of the PMCMC in 2002. With the establishment of the PMEMD, the role of coordination is taken from the secretary of NSC and is distributed to different institutions, depending on the nature of the crisis. To ease data flow and local administration, the establishment of local crisis coordination centers at a province and county level is enabled. It becomes then less military controlled. The State Planning Agency (SPA), making long-term economic and socio-cultural plans, introduced the first disaster component in 79. Then in 96, more guidelines have been given to support political decisions, and after the quake a major reorganization plan is implemented. 4- Analyze, comparison and future perspectives Here, I will only emphasize the major concerns at the state level and try to provide some key issues for a better system. To start with, it is obvious that the changes that occurred over time are all reactive and not proactive. For this reason, the system will continue to change after each disaster. I find this trial and error approach very superficial, as it is case specific driven. The SPA was at the center of critics for not foreseeing the lacks in the system in time, but also not insisting in the implementation of its plans. So, there are experts and knowledge about the subject but their views are not included in politics, the planning is mainly done on daily base and a very frequent change of government makes the institutionalization difficult. The pre structure was based on a heavily centralized authority where the military was directly involved; this has been decreased in the post structure. The multitude of organization in management was a problem before and remains a problem after the changes. The PMCMC has no legal status as it has no law authorizing its establishment and has been sued several times, all left uncharged. It is the supreme decision maker and coordinator in all kind of crisis, with very extended authority and an influence of the military. The PMEMD has been formed mainly as a result of the MEER project and has a very similar function to the MPWS but at larger extent, and has no budget. Still it is important as a permanent branch reporting to the prime minister and working under the PMCMC. Before all these organizations, the MPWS was responsible of natural disasters only, leaving the scene to the cabinet for coping with other crisis. So still there is a lack of a unique, civic, permanent structure. The NGOs played a more than ever important role in the earthquake, but still they are not to sit around this decision-making or even coordination table. Instead, the TRC becomes under strict control of the state and the law 2908, concerning NGOs, still forbids their activities to be in paramilitary or civic defense fields. And still the whole DCM concept is seen as paramilitary. There was no and still isn’t any prearrangement between different institutions. Who is responsible is clearly seen but of what, this is to be decided in crisis time. The lack of funding for disaster is still a great issue; no change has been made in this subject. Currently the MIA has a fund for civic defense activities, the prime Ministry has a special fund for coordination activities and the MPWS has a disaster fund for all response and recovery activities. But the latter is not the coordinator anymore, it only executes. All man work of the governmental organizations is to be provided for free and their equipment cost has to be generated through their own budget. Mitigation has been ignored for long time and was perceived at state level only as the enforcement of building codes. And this is was the reason for MPWS to be a major player. The insurance pool created by the MEER loan is a good concept but very inadequate to the Turkish culture. To explain it is maximum regional appliance of 30% in the disaster region and its failure nationwide is no magic. The same has happened before with the mandatory traffic insurance, still in regulation with very low appliance. The concept simply does not fit. As future implications, I think that the DCM has to be seen as a purely state function and responsibility. The actual scope of crisis is too broad and is the main reason for a multitude of agencies to be involved. By narrowing the scope, the army can be freed of coordination activity and still be used as resource. Military or constitutional threats should be managed in another arrangement than natural disasters. A general disaster fund has to be created and it should be at the disposition of the coordinator, not those who executes. The NGOs have to be involved and encouraged in an active way and the legislation concerning this matter should change. All has been said and done for coordination but still clear executive delineation does not exist. The Turkish state has great means and should be able to use them in a more efficient and effective way, for this the required prearrangements should be defined. The centralized authority has been somewhat spread by making governors responsible of taking preventive measures and responding to disasters but they are under the MIA, and have limited influence over regional governmental organizations’ heads, responding to their ministries. To solve this, the role of the MPWS has to be transferred to the MIA and its budget centralized. To conclude, a change in the definition of crisis is needed at the base, the too much unified DCM structure involves too many agencies without really coordinating them. As the supreme decision-maker and players involved change depending on the crisis, no clear task distribution, prearrangement and funding can be done. Appendix A: List of Acronyms DCM Disaster and Crisis Management FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GDCD General Directorate of Civic Defense GDNDW General Directorate of Natural Disaster Works MEER Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs MPWS Ministry of Public Works and Settlement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non Governmental Organization NSC National Security Council PMCMC Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center PMEMD Prime Ministry Emergency Management Directorate SAR Search And Rescue SPA State Planning Agency TRC Turkish Red Crescent WW World War Appendix B: References Turkish Prime Ministry: - http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/deprem/deprem.htm - “Depremler 1999”, T.C. Basbakanlik Kriz Yonetim Merkezi, August 2000, 296 pages Directory of Civil Defense: - http://www.ssgm.gov.tr Regulations and laws: - http://www.mevbank.com/ - http://yargitay.gov.tr Reports and news: - http://www.metu.edu.tr/home/wwwdmc - http://emsturkey2002.org - http://unisdr.org/unisdr/izmitintegral.htm - http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/deprem/dptdepremraporu.doc - http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/01/12/t/siyaset/sivil.html - http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/2002/06/04/hab05b.html - http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/01/10/t/siyaset/basbakan.html - http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/1999/10/06/allhabb.html - http://www.geocities.com/keege_2000/proje.html Web sites: - http://dask.gov.tr/index.html Article: - “Administration Publique et la gestion d’urgence en Turquie: le cas des seismes de 17 Aout et 12 Novembre 1999”, Guray Erol, Galatasaray University, 52 pages |