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NOTICE:
TIEMS Transportation Safety and Security Workshop January 28-29th 2003
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Welcome to
the
Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management
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| January 2003
Volume 3 - Number 4 |
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Links:
Current events
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Communications in Crisis and Emergency Management
By Falah Al-Mahan
The roots of emergency management, or “disaster planning,”
are found in the civil defense programs of World War II and the Cold War.
According to Levinson and Granot, prior to the 1990s such planning neglected
issues pertaining to non-military needs (such as civilian protection) (11).
However, communications have always been regarded as a vital aspect of emergency
management. As stated by Levinson and Granot, regardless of the type of disaster,
“if respondents are not in contact with each other, and if information (whether
it be reports or instructions) does not flow properly, it is hard to envision
a successful disaster response” (97). In the past, it was argued that communications,
as well as the other elements in emergency management function most effectively
when centralized in the disaster-site command center, or emergency operation
center (EOC). For example, in their 1996 text Hightower and Coutu claim that
effective emergency management calls for the utilization of a “star” type
of network, in which one central organization is connected directly to all
others, “and communications or exchanges are sent directly from, or indirectly
through, the central one” (93-94). The emergency management planners have always been concerned about the possible disruption of communications when handling a disaster situation. Often, the disaster itself can cause communications systems (telephone lines, for example) to be damaged. In addition, heavy use of communications systems during an emergency event can cause the systems to become “overloaded” and thus inoperable (Levinson and Granot 97). The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), established in 1995, is one of the methods designed for overcoming this problem. This service enables emergency workers to gain “access to a special telephone circuit when normal channels are choked” (Anthes 83). Yet, “priority lines” of this type did not provide a perfect solution to the problem; as stated by Hightower and Coutu, “priority and ordinary lines are equally vulnerable to cable, switch, and power supply damage” (90). Furthermore, as noted by Anthes in 1997, the GETS system was incapable of securing “priority access to cellular phone circuits, which are often jammed during a crisis” (83). In the past, emergency management communications was also subject to problems related to a lack of interoperability. As claimed by Steinhauer and Bauer, interoperability, or “the ability of various public safety organizations to communicate with each other on demand,” is one of the most important factors in emergency management (40). Yet, in the late 1990s, it was reported that the existing computer and communications systems “lack interoperability among the myriad federal, state and local emergency response agencies” (Anthes 83). As an example, Hightower and Coutu (writing in the late 1990s) noted the importance of radio communications as an alternative to telephone communications; however, these authors also noted that “incompatibility of radio systems and frequencies constitutes a major obstacle to coordination” (90). In particular, according to Anthes, although “an integrated crisis management system is available for use by military forces... nothing comparable exists to support civilian emergency response” (83). The literature of the late 1990s also made reference to the need for the development of better “redundancy” in emergency communications systems (that is, the implementation and use of back-up systems). An example of how emergency management communications functioned in the past can be seen in the case of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, in which the various response agencies lacked the ability to effectively communicate with one another (Anthes 83). Another example can be seen in the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, in which “emergency response teams resorted to writing notes and using runners after the local wireless communication systems had been overwhelmed” (Berry and Kenyon 64). Another example showing the problem of the lack of interoperability can be seen in the case of the Red Cross organization in 1997. At the time it was reported that, although the organization maintained an information database for use by emergency responders, the computerized system was not “linked to systems at state and local Red Cross offices, which must communicate via fax and phone” (Anthes 83). The terrorist attacks on Washington DC and New York City on September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in the views on how communications should function in emergency management. In the words of Berry and Kenyon, “the terrorist attacks of September 11 put the nation’s critical information infrastructure to the test, and members of industry, the military and all levels of civil government came away from the experience with a new sense of urgency to work cooperatively to address the challenges revealed that day” (64). One of the most important lessons of the 9-11 attacks was that disasters related to international terrorism are not limited only to military targets. Rather, the attacks conclusively showed that the civilian population is “as imperiled as military forces” (Peirce 2). There were both failures and successes to be seen in the use of communications systems during the time of the 9-11 crisis. In Washington DC, for example, confusion occurred “when contradictory orders spurred a monumental traffic jam in downtown Washington and ‘first responders’ at the Pentagon were hampered by incompatible radio systems” (Peirce 2). On the other hand, a 2002 report from the Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) found that responders at the Pentagon were able to attain “true interoperability” in radio operations for “the first time in the region,” despite the use of different frequency bands (Piazza 33). In New York City, problems in communications included the fact that the city’s EOC (located nearby the World Trade Center towers) became inoperable during the early stage of the disaster. In addition, the collapse of the towers disrupted telephone lines in the area. These problems, along with the overloading of communications lines, meant that “access to telephone, cellular, pager, and email communications was sporadic” (Cohen, et al. 24). Tragically, it was determined that “field-communication failures... resulted in delayed evacuation and the death of hundreds of firefighters” at the scene (Cohen, et al. 24). Nevertheless, despite such problems, the emergency at the World Trade Center showed that the city’s back-up communications systems were effective (Cohen, et al 24). For example, responders at the scene were able to make effective use of the GETS system to make priority calls. Furthermore, in the days following the attack, emergency workers were benefited by the use of a new Wireless Priority Service (WPS), a system that “designates key circuits in wireless systems for priority use” (Berry and Kenyon 64). Analysis of the situation at the World Trade Center provides various lessons regarding the utilization of communications systems by emergency managers. For example, as reported by Cohen, et al. in Public Administration Review, the situation clearly showed the importance of redundancy: “cellular and wired emergency communications systems must have at least two levels of backup to reduce the odds of failure during emergencies” (24). In contrast to earlier thinking on the subject, the crisis also revealed that “emergency response procedures must assume communications breakdowns and allow for decentralized decision making” (24). According to Cohen, et al., the importance of daily coordination meetings in the days following the attacks also showed that even “in this era of email and cell phones, face-to-face communications proved essential” (24). Following the 9-11 attacks, various proposals have been made regarding new approaches for making the best use of communications systems during a large-scale emergency. The attacks (and the anthrax scare following the attacks) showed that terrorism, including bioterrorism, are serious threats and thus emergency management planning and preparation must likewise be taken seriously. This includes placing serious concern on the implementation and testing of emergency communications systems. The attacks on civilian targets made it clear that such planning must not be limited only to military organizations and federal agencies, but must also be incorporated among state and local governments and private industry as well (Berry and Kenyon 64). An example of this way of thinking can be seen in a June 2002 issue of the journal RN, regarding the importance of emergency management planning for hospitals. This article urges hospital managers to comply with the emergency management standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Among other things, these standards emphasize the importance of “ongoing open channels of external and internal communication” (Steinhauer and Bauer 40). Regarding the importance of communications interoperability, the RN article points out “common problems include equipment failure in ‘dead spots,’ interference, and channel congestion” (40). The existence of these problems requires planning for redundancy in communications; for example, “some alternatives include two-way radio, amateur (‘ham’) radio, fax, e-mail, video conferencing, or even a courier system” (40). The article also notes, “all staff members need training in the proper use of whatever communication systems are to be used, and all equipment needs to be tested and updated regularly” (40). In the wake of the 9-11 attacks, it has been proposed that state and local governments develop regional plans for coordinated emergency response communications. An example of this type of planning can be seen in the Washington DC metropolitan area’s Regional Incident Coordination and Communications System (RICCS). This system utilizes various communications resources in order to ensure rapid response to potential emergency situations. Although centered in Washington DC, the RICCS system is also designed to be redundant, by having alternative centers located in the neighboring states of Maryland and Virginia (Peirce 2). It has also been proposed that this approach to coordinated interagency communications can be applied on a nationwide level. For example, following the 9-11 attacks, the Department of Defense (DOD) has sponsored the development of a system called DERIS (Domestic Emergency Response Information Services), for the purpose of providing emergency managers with real-time access to counter-terrorism and disaster response data. DERIS is specifically designed to overcome the problems of interoperability failure; as such, it is described as “a secure Internet portal to allow multiple users - with different protocols and different systems - to access the latest information and communicate directly with each other in real time” (Griffiths and Cady 28). A demonstration of the DERIS system (involving a simulated terrorist scenario) was conducted in March 2002, in which emergency management personnel in Virginia, Illinois and California were successfully linked to one another. In order to overcome the problems associated with systems overload, it has also been proposed that methods be developed to enable civilian-based emergency managers to “leverage the existing deployable transmission assets of the military” (Gerlitz 45). As reported in Signal, the journal of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), military resources are highly effective in handling emergency situations because they are both redundant and decentralized. For example, the military systems make use of such things as satellites and multichannel radios; furthermore, the equipment is highly mobile and is “dispersed nationwide” (Gerlitz 45). As reported in Signal, a cost-effective approach to this solution could be obtained through the modification of existing commercial equipment. In this regard, a recently developed technology known as “gateway-bridging” can be utilized to provide “interoperability between commercial and military networks” (Gerlitz 45). The linking of “tactical” and “commercial” systems would help to overcome the problem of the past, in which military and civilian emergency communications were built around separate systems. In this way, the proposed solution would meet the need (perceived as vital in the post-9-11 world) of developing “inventive new public-private liaisons” (Peirce 2). Other proposals have been made following 9-11 in regard to the need to attain better communications redundancy. For example, it has been proposed that the traditional EOC concept be expanded to include the development of “Virtual Emergency Operations Centers” (VEOC). The importance of this proposal is seen in the fact that New York City’s EOC became inoperative early on during the 9-11 terrorist attacks. A VEOC provides decentralization as well as redundancy; utilizing computerized links, it enables emergency managers “to share information, make decisions and deploy resources without being physically present in the EOC” (Davis 46). Another proposal involves the further development and deployment of a new experimental truck (called the InfraLynx), designed by the Naval Research Laboratory. This satellite-linked vehicle is equipped with “all the technologies needed for local first-responders to remain connected to state and federal agencies when the conventional communications infrastructure is destroyed in a terrorist attack” (Erwin 31). The approach to the redundancy problem by FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency) is found in the development of a telecommunications system known as MERS (Mobile Emergency Response Support). As described at FEMA’s website, MERS utilizes “a variety of communications transmissions systems such as satellite, high frequency, and microwave line-of-sight.” It has also been proposed that laser technology can provide an effective backup in emergency situations, when Internet connections, as well as telephone lines, have become inoperable (Mearian 7). Analysis of these various proposals yields many good ideas for new approaches to emergency management communications. However, it can also be seen that there are certain problem areas that still need to be overcome for the attainment of increased communications effectiveness in the future. For example, in regard to the interoperability issue, Piazza notes in Security Management that although a high degree of coordination was attained by first-responders on the scene at the Pentagon (following the 9-11 attacks), communications difficulties began to occur after state and federal agencies arrived on the scene (33). This shows that there is a need for further standardization of communications equipments and procedures throughout the different agencies involved in emergency management. Along with this, it is recommended that regional agencies become linked with a system similar to the RICCS system developed in the Washington DC area. On a nationwide level, there is a need for further development of the DERIS system. As noted earlier, DERIS is effective in overcoming the interoperability problem because it was designed to be compatible even for users with “different protocols and different systems” (Griffiths and Cady 28). As this paper has also discussed, the 9-11 attacks made it clear that emergency management planning (including its communication aspects) is something that can no longer be limited only to federal and military agencies. Therefore, it is recommended that further work be conducted on developing and implementing the “gateway-bridging” technology that will enable civilian emergency managers to connect to military-based communications systems. As discussed in this paper, it is also important that all emergency management communications systems be designed for redundancy. Since access to telephone lines, cellular phones, and even the Internet can all be disrupted during times of emergency, there is a need for the implementation of various back-up systems (utilizing, for example, radio or fax systems). Along with this, it is recommended that further deployment be made of the InfraLynx truck system discussed earlier in this paper, a system that was first developed in the wake of the 9-11 attacks and first utilized during the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City (Erwin 31). Another alternative communications system for emergency use can be found in the further development of laser beam technology. Related to the redundancy concept is the need for decentralization of emergency communications - an idea that contrasts earlier thinking on the need for centralization in emergency management. EOC’s will continue to be an important element in emergency management (and communications) in the future; however, as the situation in the 9-11 attacks showed, such physical centers are subject to damage and disruption just as telephone lines are. With this view in mind, it is recommended that further research and development be conducted in regard to the “virtual” EOC concept. Of course, with increased reliance on remote computerized systems, it is also important that ongoing improvements be made in the utilization of online security systems. Therefore, as this paper has shown, the 9-11 attacks on New York City and Washington DC marked a turning point in the views on how the communications function should be employed in emergency management. The various proposals and recommendations discussed in this paper represent the ways in which communication systems can and should change in upcoming years in order to improve the effectiveness of responders in handling large-scale emergency situations. Appendix 1 Acronyms Used in this Paper AFCEA - Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association DOD - Department of Defense DERIS - Domestic Emergency Response Information Services EOC - Emergency Operations Center FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency GETS - Government Emergency Telecommunications Service JCAHO - Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations PSWN - Public Safety Wireless Network RICCS - Regional Incident Coordination and Communications System VEOC - Virtual Emergency Operations Center WPS - Wireless Priority Service Appendix 2 Websites for Further Information Federal Emergency Management Agency <www.fema.gov> International Association of Emergency Managers <www.iaem.com> Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations <www.jcaho.org> National Domestic Preparedness Office <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/ndpo> National League of Cities <www.nlc.org> Security Management <www.securitymanagement.com> Signal Magazine <http://www.us.net/signal> U.S. Department of Justice <www.ojp.usdoj.gov> Bibliography Anthes, Gary H. “Red Alert.” Computerworld 31(27) (July 7, 1997), pp. 83-84. Berry, Sharon, and Henry S. Kenyon. “Governments, Industry Must Coordinate Homeland Security Measures.” Signal 56(9) (May 2002), pp. 64-66. Cohen, Steven, William Eimicke, and Jessica Horan. “Catastrophe and the Public Service: A Case Study of the Government Response to the Destruction of the World Trade Center.” Public Administration Review 62 (September 2002), pp. 24-32. Davis, Steven C. “Virtual Emergency Operations Centers.” Risk Management 49(7) (July 2002), pp. 46-52. Erwin, Sandra I. “Security Vehicle Links First Responders with State, Feds.” National Defense 86(583) (June 2002), p. 31. Gerlitz, Kyle A. “Linking Military and Commercial Communications.” Signal 56(9) (May 2002), pp. 45-47. Griffiths, Keith, and Geoff Cady. “DERIS: Domestic Emergency Response Information Services.” Law & Order 50(8) (August 2002), pp. 28-34. Hightower, Henry C., and Michel Coutu. “Coordinating Emergency Management: A Canadian Example.” Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada: The Politics, Policymaking, Administration and Analysis of Emergency Management. Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr., eds. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1996, pp. 69-99. Levinson, Jay, and Hayim Granot. Transportation Disaster Response Handbook. San Diego, California: Academic Press, 2002. Mearian, Lucas. “Lasers Eyed as Medium for Disaster Communications.” Computerworld 36(11) (March 4, 2002), p. 7. Peirce, Neal. “Model ‘Homeland Security’ Plan - Metro Washington, Where Else?” Nation’s Cities Weekly 25(17) (April 29, 2002), p. 2. Piazza, Peter. “Wireless Works for First Responders.” Security Management 46(4) (April 2002), p. 33. Steinhauer, Rene, and Jeff Bauer. “The Emergency Management Plan.” RN 65(6) (June 2002), pp. 40-45. |