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Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management Newsletter Website |
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December
2007
Volume 13
- Number 3 |
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Report on 2003 San Diego Fires By Lee Ross "I would like to apologize to all the people who
lost loved ones, family members, property and animals. I pray for you every
day. I know they are in a better place with God. I wish I was dead instead.
This is killing me. I am sorry." Those were the words spoken by a teary-eyed
Sergio Martinez inside a California courtroom during his sentencing for starting
the 2003 Cedar Fire—the biggest and most destructive fire in California’s
history. Martinez was sentenced to a halfway house and served no time
behind bars despite purposely setting the blaze that killed 15 people, cost
an estimated $400 million, destroyed 4,847 structures and consumed 273,246
acres of Southern California near and inside San Diego. The latter two figures
represent all-time highs for the state. Martinez was hunting on October
25, 2003 in the Cleveland National Forest when he became separated from a
buddy. He set the fire hoping the smoke would work as a signal to reuniting
them. Instead, the small fire quickly spread through the dry timberland.
Homeowners close to the fire’s origin complained that state and local emergency agencies made a flawed and fateful decision not to immediately deploy air resources against the growing fire late in the afternoon of the 25th. Strong overnight winds and ground brush ripe for a raging fire produced a perfect recipe for the Cedar Fire. By the time the sun came back up—it was too late. A city of San Diego after action fire report noted that within 17 hours from the time Mr. Martinez started his smoke signal the fire had quickly swept across 116,000 acres. The report’s author, now-former fire chief Jeff Bowman, concluded his fire department was “under-funded, under-staffed and inadequately trained to respond effectively to complex incidents for extended operational periods.” Bowman’s recommendations to his city council included $100 million in capital improvements for new fire stations and equipment. Also, he said the department needed an additional $40 million annual in operation expenses. Those were costs deemed too much by civic leaders and the community at large, which voted down a ballot referendum just four months after the fire to help with fire protection. Bowman, four years later and just months removed from stepping down as chief, was forced to evacuate his family from a slightly smaller wildfire told a reporter “the whole county is fire protection poor. Bottom line is staffing has not improved.” The Cedar and other California fires in 2003 resulted in a “blue ribbon” report on how to better respond and coordinate state, federal and local entities. Its sobering assessment noted “that conflicting public policy mandates, lengthy bureaucratic administrative processes and procedures, and antagonistic litigation tactics were the most significant barriers and impediments to reducing the threat of wildland fires and preventing periodic, catastrophic loss of life and property from such disasters.” But the report also offered its rather straightforward but difficult to achieve solution. “The key to protecting our communities and residents is through fire prevention and effective vegetation/fuels management programs.” California Blue Ribbon Fire Commission Final Report http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/978596171691962788256b350061870e/3D3127F2BCFF01B688256DE3005FAF6E?OpenDocument City of San Diego’s 2003 Cedar Fire After Action Report http://www.sandiego.gov/fireandems/pdf/afteraction03.pdf Other Background Sources http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2005/11/18/news/top_stories/20_24_4711_17_05.txt http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2005/10/25/news/top_stories/101405195938.txt http://www.latimes.com.news/local/la-me-prepare23oct23,0,5020072 |