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Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Crisis and Emergency Management Newsletter Website |
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December
2005
Volume 9 - Number
3 |
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The week of February 11th, 1996 had been an unusually busy week at the Rescue Squad, and like any given Friday evening, the Squad was short of volunteers to man the units. I couldn’t wait for the Friday night crewmembers to start trickling in, so that I could embark on my long awaited date with a new friend. I donned my “paint the night red” outfit and was looking forward to a fun filled evening, away from the rescue squad that I called home. At around 1730hrs, in the midst of an area wide snowstorm, a message over the house PA system from the Emergency Communication Center (ECC) for fire in the Silver Spring (BOX 19) area. “Damn,” I thought to myself, “I wish that was in our first response area.” As I continued to get ready, the Box Alert pre-alert was sounded for a report of a train derailment with fire, behind the 1900 block of Littonsville Road. This was followed by 45 seconds of data bursts and quick call pager tones to alert individual units. The initial dispatch sent several Fire Engines, Truck Companies, Rescue Squads, Ambulances and Medic Units toward the scene. The first arriving engine company reported a confirmed train derailment, many injured and two fires at opposite ends of the train. I dashed as fast as my high heels could carry me from the ladies room to the sleeping quarters, where I slid down the poll, oblivious to the fact that I was wearing a cocktail dress. Without hesitation I grabbed my gear, and jumped into the back of Rescue Squad 18 as we sped through the traffic in response to the biggest call since the 1982 Air Florida crush in the Potomac River. “On-scene command was established and an immediate second alarm assignment was requested. The mass-casualty and HAZMAT equipment was also dispatched as part of the second alarm. Several minutes later a third alarm was requested. The incident command structure was established and alternate channels put into service. Fire ground operations were moved to its own channel. EMS operations were moved to their own channel. Logistics and Staging was moved to yet another channel. The second and third alarm utilized heavy mutual aid units from neighboring counties.” http://www.reactintl.org/nuz/nuz-2388.19960216a.htm Our unit responded to the side where the MARC train had struck the second of the Amtrak engines. The front of the lead car was crushed and the left side partially torn away as the car was deflected along the side of the Amtrak train. The second Amtrak locomotive (which carried its fuel tanks outside the main structure) had ruptured on impact and fuel was sprayed into the wreckage and ignited. Amongst the passengers who were in this compartment were 14 Job Corps trainees, returning home for their first leave since joining the government-training scheme. Also in that car were the 3 CSX crew, the engineer, the conductor and the assistant conductor. Despite responding to the call within 11 minutes of dispatch, and forcefully gaining entry into blazing compartment, there were no viable rescues from our compartment. In other parts of the wreckage, many passengers were rescued and transported to local hospitals. Recovery efforts ensued throughout the evening and into the night. All in all, I think the response and recovery effort unfolded as best as one could hope for. The success of this mass casualty incident management was not by chance, but by the diligent planning, preparation, procedures and training that had been established and carried out before the incident. This pre-planning and preparation effort paid off too during the September 11th attack at the Pentagon. |